PROGRAM peduli

Understanding Social Exclusion in Indonesia

A meta-analysis of Program Peduli's Theory of Change documents

Acknowledgements

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Summary

This study analyses the reports that resulted from 68 Theory of Change workshops held with NGO and CSO partners as part of the Peduli program. This program addresses the social exclusion of six disadvantaged groups in Indonesia: vulnerable children and youth, remote indigenous communities reliant on natural resources, discriminated religious minorities, victims of gross human rights violations, waria (transgender women), and people with disabilities. The objective of the study was to identify the most common types of social exclusion reported by the partners, the most significant actors involved in both exclusion and inclusion, and the types of social change that were envisioned as being most important in facilitating inclusion.

State barriers to accessing official identity documents, the lack of which results in exclusion from many public services and livelihood opportunities, was identified as the most common type of exclusion, along with community led stigmatization. The study shows that these two types of discrimination are at least correlated. The most important stakeholders involved in inclusion were identified as the excluded group themselves. However, it is also evident that that no single stakeholder group acting independently has the power needed to generate inclusion. Capacity, awareness, inclination and leadership within the excluded group needs to be combined with local government efforts, and willingness to implement existing policies, external group expertise, and positive media coverage. In other words, coalitions for inclusion were identified by the CSOs as the most likely pathway to social inclusion, rather than highly targeted programs addressing discrete issues.

Whilst some commonalities are identified across the excluded groups regarding the circumstances and experiences of exclusion, and the elements required to work towards inclusion, it was recognised that every group has its own particular local context and particular experiences of exclusion which need to be addressed individually. Nevertheless, partners are shown to regard the increased fulfilment of human rights as central to reducing social exclusion in Indonesia, and that improving social acceptance, compared with improving policy, or access to services, is the most relevant starting point.

Introduction

Program background

Program Peduli is a Government of Indonesia program which promotes social inclusion as a pathway out of poverty. The first phase, which was managed by the World Bank, ran from March 2011, and since April 2014 the program has been implemented by The Asia Foundation (TAF) operating under the oversight of the Coordinating Ministry of Development and Culture (Kemenko PMK). TAF works in partnership with seven national umbrella organizations, and 79 local non-government organizations (NGOs) in 84 districts in 26 of Indonesia's 34 provinces. The objective is to benefit six socially excluded communities which experience poverty but are underserved by government social protection programs. These six 'pillars' are:

1. Vulnerable children and youth;
2. Remote indigenous communities reliant on natural resources;
3. Discriminated religious minorities;
4. Victims of gross human rights violations;
5. Waria (transgender);
6. People with disabilities.

By December 2015, the program had reached 20,100 marginalized poor people, and it is projected to benefit 42,000 individuals in total by December 2016, when the second phase is scheduled to conclude. Kemenko PMK has reiterated its aspiration to offer Peduli as a national model for how to effectively foster social inclusion for marginalized communities. Aside from benefitting excluded individuals and communities, the program is contributing to the evidence base concerning exclusion and poverty, with both qualitative and quantitative investigations.

An over-arching assumption of the program's design is that reducing poverty in excluded communities requires changes in the social relations that govern access to resources and economic opportunities. The program therefore partners with civil society organizations (CSOs) which convene stakeholders and foster dialogue to strengthen social relations between excluded groups and their surrounding community, and ensure that government and policy are responsive to their needs. In this context the program supports activities such as:

- establishing and empowering solidarity groups of marginalized groups;
- facilitating community dialogue, often through cultural, social and sports events;
- offering services and programming through community level volunteers;
- bridging access to public services, with the support of district government;
- facilitating beneficiary groups to engage in local and village governance, particularly regarding village funds;

- with support of Kemenko PMK, drawing on national level government policies and resources;
- developing links to national social justice campaigns.

Peduli's CSO partners draw on local knowledge and assets to solve local problems, and engage with local conveners and multi-stakeholder coalitions. Working through carefully defined cycles of planning, implementation, reflection, learning and revision, the strategic objective of the program is to improve social inclusion for those who have been socially excluded. Specific end of program outcomes include:

1. Increased access to public services and social assistance. This includes increased access to livelihoods assistance, health services, education services, social protection, and legal identity and justice services.
2. Increased fulfilment of human rights. This includes increased sense of empowerment, civic participation, protection against violence and exploitation, and improved recognition and social acceptance of marginalized communities.
3. Improved policy on social inclusion. This includes sharing knowledge about social inclusion with policy makers, and ensuring that national and regional policy is responsive to the economic and social needs of marginalized individuals.

Social exclusion in Indonesia

Over the past decades, strong economic growth has reduced income poverty incidence in Indonesia from over 50% of the population in the mid-1970s, to 24% in 1999, and to 11% in 2013 (Asian Development Bank, 2014; World Bank, 2014). The benefits of this reduction have, however, not reached all members of society equally, and socially excluded groups in particular have found themselves disadvantaged. Recognizing that social exclusion is multidimensional and has causes and effects that vary significantly across

excluded groups, TAF began the second phase of the program by convening Technical Working Groups (TWG) consisting of experts, academics and practitioners, tasked with addressing the issues associated with each target group.

This process produced several early observations about the nature of social exclusion in Indonesia. Among these observations are that there is a high degree of variance in the types of social exclusion experienced by Peduli's target groups. Some indigenous groups experience stigma related to caste-like social stratifications, while others are excluded because of their geographical remoteness. Some religious minorities are stigmatized because they are viewed as a threat by mainstream religions, while others face stereotypes of being 'backwards' because of their traditional beliefs. Prejudice against people with disabilities and marginalized youth often resembles pity, while *waria* have some basis for social acceptance in some places (such as Sulawesi and the indigenous concept of Bissu) but are largely seen as 'immoral'.

There is also a broad range in the intensity of stigma experienced as reported by the CSOs. Ahmadiyah and Syiah and Sunni religious minorities face stigma that often results in violent attacks. Victims of past human rights violations are often themselves ashamed of their status, and those who speak out are often quickly silenced. Groups such as child labour and people with disabilities are regarded more sympathetically, while groups such as children in prison and *waria* fall somewhere in between. All groups experience harassment, and some face open hostility when they attempt to form solidarity groups among their members, particularly victims of human rights violations and religious minorities.

The excluders vary widely. For *waria*, people with disabilities and vulnerable children, family members are often the primary excluders. Most beneficiary groups face exclusion from economic opportuni-

ties and local decision making processes by their neighbours and the surrounding community. Some face exclusion by the state at different levels. Such groups include, for example, indigenous communities whose land rights are not secure, and victims of gross human rights violations whose status remains unacknowledged. From their experience of exclusion from layers of society, some groups are more likely to self-exclude which feeds into a never-ending cycle of community exclusion.

All groups experience economic exclusion, which ranges from the inability to access credit services due to lack of legal identity, to exclusion from job opportunities and markets based on prejudice. All groups also experience some level of exclusion from public services.

Specifically, regarding each pillar, the Technical Working Groups made the following observations:

1. Vulnerable children and youth

Children who do not enjoy conventional family life or who are not in school may become marginalized and socially excluded, often as a result of stereotyping and stigmatization. At worst, vulnerable children may be forced to work in hazardous conditions, or trafficked into the sex industry. While the legal framework to protect children in Indonesia is strong, implementation of the law is inconsistent, and coordination between agencies is often lacking. Most marginalised children come from families living in poverty. Young people from low-income families often enter the formal or informal labour market at a young age to help support their families, and as they lack skills, they typically do informal work for low wages, and have poor prospects. Young people are particularly vulnerable during the transition from dependence to independence.

Within this pillar, specific Peduli target groups include:

- Children who are forced into prostitution, and/ or who are victims of trafficking.

These children may be excluded by their families and communities, and by the state through the criminalization of their activities. They are exploited by intermediaries who profit from their labour, lack access to education, health and vocational services, and may experience psychosocial problems, including alcohol and drug abuse.

- Young people in correctional facilities
Most young people in Indonesian correctional facilities have limited or no access to educational and vocational programs, and may become isolated from their families due to the cost of visits. Once released, they face stigma and prejudice as they are presumed to still be criminals, and the system offers only very limited rehabilitation and reintegration services.

- Street children and adolescents
Increased numbers of street children were observed following the 1997-1998 economic crisis engaged in a variety of activities, including busking and begging on the street, and providing informal services in markets. Many still live with their families, but older children are likely to be stigmatized and considered a public nuisance or even criminals.

- Child plantation workers
Indonesia's plantation sector continues to expand rapidly, and plantations tend to absorb labour from nearby villages, including children. Plantation work is on Indonesia's official list of the 12 most hazardous types of work for children.

- Child domestic workers
When children live in the household where they work, they tend to drop out of school, and are denied their basic rights to rest, leisure, play and recreation. They are also denied regular contact with their parents and peers and may be socially isolated.

2. Remote indigenous communities reliant on natural resources

Indigenous communities may form part of broader society, but usually have traditions, common interests, and ties to specific physical localities and related natural resources which are passed down from generation to generation. Since independence, proclaimed in 1945, and even extending before that, to Dutch colonial times, misperceptions associated with the collectivist, communalist and 'backward' nature of such groups, especially their presumed reliance on subsistence agriculture, have legitimized state efforts to relocate such communities, and/or to change their agricultural practices. The marginalization of these groups, members of which were forced to adopt a national identity and deny their traditional rights, particularly to the land, reached its peak during the New Order period (1967-1997).

Today, Indonesia is a signatory to the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) which stipulates rights to self-identification and self-determination, rights to land, territory and resources, and rights to grant un-coerced consent for development activities. However, challenges continue to exist relating to legal identity, community recognition and guarantees of rights, particularly to land and the recognition of religion. This marginalization has been exacerbated by national economic growth that is heavily reliant on forestry and the extraction of natural resources. Communally held land has been seized on the grounds that state and public interests are pre-eminent, particularly in forest areas, which cover roughly half of the land area of Indonesia. These seizures and related contestations have in many cases given rise to complex and serious social conflicts, including violent ones.

Over time, the strong centralistic authority of the national government has systematically displaced traditional institutions with non-indigenous institutions. As a result, government decisions do not consider local needs, but are grounded in formal laws that make no consideration of local autonomy, customs, traditions and cultural diversity. The greatest vulnerability occurs in communities that are geographically isolated. These groups cannot readily access basic services, and may be ignored when it comes to the provision of even the most basic services.

3. Discriminated religious minorities

Aside from the six religions recognized by the State (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism), Indonesia has thousands of diverse faith groups, and 245 'local' religions have been recorded. Manifestations of exclusion include loss of legal identity, threatened and actual violence, barriers to social services such as healthcare and education, loss of economic assets, livelihoods and the right to worship, and exclusion from community activities. Religious minorities can lose their right to participate in civic forums, express their views, and be citizens with full basic rights including state protection, respect and welfare.

Behind many conflicts supposedly based on religion there is often an underlying sense of injustice, the roots of which can be traced to economic and resource-based interests. Indonesia's colonial history provides one explanation. Before 1945, citizens were regularly divided according to ethnicity and race, and whilst privileges were granted to certain groups as reciprocation for their loyalty, other groups were seen as threats, and discriminated against.

This approach hardened during the New Order period (1967-1997) when strict nationalistic policies promoted national unity and suppressed acknowledgment of diversity, and a centralized authoritarian government cast religious issues as political issues, which had severe effects on social relations. During the 1997-1998 transition of political power, riots included widespread violence, arson and rape

directed at ethnically Chinese Indonesians, who were assumed to be non-Muslim. Subsequently, religious-tinged violence against minority groups has risen. Muslim/Christian riots exploded in Ambon in 1999, for example, and conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi, persisted from 2000 to 2004. In addition, according to the Communion of Churches in Indonesia (PGI), 430 churches were forced to close between January 2005 and December 2010.

One explanation suggests that increased decentralisation has allowed more 'space' for intolerant attitudes. Another points to decentralization as allowing local regulations that promote intolerance. In any case, Indonesia's security apparatus and legal system have been proven to be inadequate on many occasions. The government and the judiciary are assumed to have political interests, and repression, rather than conflict management, has been the dominant response. When violence occurs, the state tends to blame the victims, requiring them to resolve the conflict by relocating, and thereby abandoning their land, homes and livelihoods.

Broadly, two dimension of discrimination against religious groups in Indonesia can be identified. The first sees the perpetrators as government officials, state institutions, such as law enforcement agencies, and non-state institutions such as Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), the pre-eminent clerical body. The second sees intolerance arising from community groups, particularly religious mass organizations.

4. Victims of gross human rights violations

Gross human rights violations are considered to be violations of human rights committed by a government against its citizens in the past. Such violations may be a result of government action, or when a government allows violations to happen. The term 'victim' may extend to the immediate family, or to dependents of the direct victim, as well as to people who have suffered harm assisting victims or attempt-

ing to prevent victimization. While there have been some efforts by the Indonesian government to improve the plight of some victims, access to services and social acceptance remains challenging and community stigma today continues to be strong despite the events occurring in the past and this impedes inclusion for these communities.

Inevitably the nature, scale and even the existence of gross human rights violations are often contested, but the following can be taken as indicative events that have occurred since Indonesian independence:

- Following the 1965 political transition, multiple sources have recorded that at least 500,000 people either disappeared or were killed across Indonesia. Others were tortured, imprisoned and exiled, and women were raped and forced in sexual slavery.
- In 1984, around 100 people critical of the New Order government were killed by military forces in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta.
- In 1989, military forces attacked the village of Talangsari in Lampung province. Around 100 people were killed, a greater number were injured, and others disappeared or were tortured. After the attack, hundreds were charged with subversion.
- In May 1998, riots in Jakarta that were apparently instigated by security forces resulted in over 1,000 deaths, largely as a result of arson. Over 100 women are also known to have been raped.
- Military action in Aceh prior to 2004 resulted in over 23,000 deaths and innumerable cases of forced disappearance, rape, sexual violence and torture.

Every case has unique characteristics, but similarities exist between the effects of violations on victims and their families and associates. These include stigmatization, trauma, scapegoating, exclusion, loss of identity, and protracted economic difficulties. These condi-

tions result from the interrelated and self-reinforcing attitudes and actions of the state and the community. In cases of gross human rights violations, society stigmatizes the victims precisely because there is already a stigma created by the state. Exclusion is therefore perpetuated by policy.

Since 1998, the *reformasi* era has seen increased emphasis on human rights, but these efforts have yet to restore the dignity of the victims of past violations. There is still no policy to protect victims' rights, and a culture of impunity has emerged.

5. *Waria* (transgender women)

The term *waria* describes people who are genetically males but who behave and dress as females. In some areas of Indonesia, they have long featured in traditional beliefs. Since the 1960s, they have been visible in urban areas, and became increasingly accepted in public life in the 1980s and 1990s. In 2010, estimates of numbers ranged from around 30,000 (by the Indonesian health ministry) to nearly four million (by Forum Komunikasi Waria Indonesia).

Since 1998 and the inception of the *reformasi* era, public sentiment has become more negative. National and local government regulations have increasingly been directed at supposedly deviant sexual behaviour, and such identities are increasingly questioned, usually in the name of morality and social order. Indonesia's HIV/AIDS epidemic, which took hold after 1998, has had a profound effect, with infection reaching as high as 30% in some sub-populations. Since *waria* have been identified as a key target group in the response, public perception of them as hyper-sexualized and/or deviant may have been strengthened. A disturbing feature of some recent cases of harassment has been the unwillingness of police to engage with the perpetrators, and cases of violence against individuals have been reported, including at least one murder.

Many *waria* are comfortable living in their own culture and working in professions such as entertainers and in salons. In terms of participation in public life, *waria* do not experience explicit barriers when seeking services and employment, and official recognition is generally positive. But much state programming, which is orientated largely around rehabilitation and reintegration, suggests that *waria* are seen as aberrant, and social isolation, stigmatization and discrimination create barriers to full participation in public life. Many *waria* who migrate to cities find themselves economically vulnerable. Low education, lack of job skills, limited job opportunities due to their non-conforming appearance, and lack of social support are key factors that lead many into sex work.

In sum, *waria* tend to be poor and live away from their families, or have strained relations with them. Many *waria* report they left school early as a result of harassment and violence from teachers and peers. The majority of *waria* feel socially stigmatized, face unique safety and security risks, and have minimal protection from state authorities such as the police. These characteristics differ greatly from other sexual minorities in Indonesia, such as gay males or lesbians, who overall have better social and economic status.

6. People with disabilities

The experience of disability in Indonesia is often one of rejection and stigmatization, first by their families, and then by the community, and discrimination and exclusion from public services such as education, health, social protection and political participation. People with disabilities are still widely perceived as not having full functioning ability (i.e. are deficient), rather than as having the ability to be functional and productive if infrastructure, services and public perceptions were adjusted (i.e. are different).

In 2012, a UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific report indicated that 1.4% of Indonesians are living with a disability (UNESCAP, 2012). The World Health Organization (WHO), however, sets a figure of 15% as a benchmark estimate

of the world's population with disabilities, and when compared with other ASEAN countries Indonesia's figure is astonishingly low (WHO, 2011). This large discrepancy is probably due to data collection methods, along with discrimination and/or ignorance. Many disabled people simply do not officially exist, and poor data clearly poses a major barrier to improving services. Using the WHO benchmark, Indonesia would have at least 37.5 million people with disability.

In 2011, Indonesia ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), and some national poverty reduction programs have made focused efforts to target people with disability. Nevertheless, efforts to engage government agencies and the public remain a struggle, and the issue is largely addressed only by people directly experiencing, or working with, disabilities. The inclusion of disabled people requires better understanding of disability, and public information campaigns to create more holistic cooperation between

local communities, disabled people organizations, government at all levels, media organizations and the private sector. Very few public service programs accommodate the rights of disabled people. Many departments and most government officials do not fully grasp or comprehend the concept of public service required by law.

The social inclusion of people with disabilities requires broad collaboration between all levels of civil society. Families requires guidance, education and encouragement to increase interaction between disabled family members and the community. Community awareness needs to be increased to improve understanding about different types of disability. Local government requires technical assistance in order to facilitate responsive policy and services, and a community approach is needed to create employment opportunities for disabled people. Employment will encourage disabled people to gain confidence, become independent and support their family.

Study background

Given the wide range of types and intensity of social exclusion experienced, and the variety of actors and social environments involved, no clear mechanism presents itself as an obvious way to reduce exclusion and increase inclusion in the case of the six groups targeted by Peduli. Early in the second phase of the program, three possible pathways to inclusion were identified, although it is recognised that social change is not linear and sometimes these processes occur in parallel or more focus is required in one area and not another in order to respond to the particular exclusion. The following graphic presents how the CSOs understood the starting points in their intervention at the time of the ToC . These included:

An explanation of the above graphic would include:

1. Facilitate Social Acceptance > Increase Access to Service > Improve Policy
    This sees facilitating social acceptance as primary, which will lead to increased access to services, and improved policy.
2. Improve Policy > Increase Access to Services > Facilitate Social Acceptance
    This sees improving policy as primary, which will lead to increased access to services, and improved social acceptance.
3. Increase Access to Services > Improve Policy > Facilitate Social Acceptance
    This sees increasing access to services as primary, which will lead to improved policy and improved social acceptance.

This study interrogates the assumptions that underpin these three different pathways. It analyses 68 papers resulting from a series of Theory of Change (ToC) workshops that were conducted with CSO and NGO partners between November 2014 and August 2015. The objective of these workshops was to aid program design, and to provide reference points for monitoring and evaluation. It was recognised that few partners had defined marginalization during phase I of the program, which resulted in poor targeting, and that more resources were needed for program design processes that included a high degree of contestability. It was also understood that government counterparts were largely focused on service outcomes, and assumed that any increase in access to services, possibly fuelled by policy direc-

tives, would bring about changes in social acceptance. Conversely, during the workshops, it emerged that most CSO partners think that changes in social acceptance will be the primary enabling factor in increasing access to services, and policy is often seen as a process parallel to improving social recognition and acceptance. Gender analysis was an explicit part of these workshops as gender adds an additional layer of exclusion to women in Peduli target groups.

A Theory of Change (ToC) approach was adopted because a primary aim of the workshops was to help stakeholders understand partners' assumptions of how social change will happen, and to identify the factors seen as key to success. Whilst stressing that there is little common consensus on how a ToC approach is defined, Stein and Valters (2012) suggest that it can be understood as an articulation of how and why a given intervention will lead to specific change. The aim in these workshops was to articulate the assumptions about the processes through which change will occur, and specify the ways in which the early and intermediate outcomes, which relate to achieving the desired long-term changes, can be brought about and documented (Harris, 2005). Carol Weiss's (1995) popularization of the term, which suggests that a ToC approach can be used to describe and explain both the assumptions associated with the incremental steps that lead to long-term goals, and the connections between the activities and outcomes that occur at each step – i.e. a theory that explains how and why an initiative works – is also relevant to the thinking that underpinned the workshops.

A ToC approach, then, focuses on explaining not just whether a program is effective as determined by an impacts-driven 'results agenda', but what methods it uses to be effective (Chris, 2011) and the objective of this study is to collate and analyse the data that resulted from the 68 ToC workshops with a view to identifying commonalities and outliers across the broad spectrum of partner organizations and activi-

ties. The study extends across a continuum identified by Stein and Valters (*op. cit.*) that runs from the use of a ToC approach as a technical planning tool, through less formal ways of thinking about how a project is expected to work, to an emphasis on the development of a complex and nuanced understanding of how change happens.

This ToC meta-analysis has two purposes. Firstly, as a first attempt to define the nature of social exclusion in three areas: according to the literature, according the TWG, and according to the CSO who took part in the TOC workshops. Secondly, it is hoped that its analysis of the types of social exclusion experienced along with the actors and stakeholders involved and the sorts of change envisioned will inform strategic planning and support implementation, and facilitate program learning through the clarification and development of theory. Regarding the latter, the study leans towards the use of a ToC approach as a tool that emphasises reflection and conceptual thinking and enables change to be explored in a way that encompasses a complex, systemic, reflexive and politically informed understanding of development (James, 2011). The aim is to collate learning about the dynamics of social exclusion in order both to inform social practice, and to contribute to the evidence base available to policy makers.

In this, the study aims to support Peduli's objectives to contribute to the discourse around aid effectiveness and the practical nuances associated with, and required by, political working. A recent series in the DFAT-funded Development Leadership Program outlined that more inclusive political settlements at the elite level are crucial to lay the foundations for more peaceful political processes. This literature also suggests that, over the long term, states and societies underpinned by more open and more broadly inclusive institutions are more resilient, and better at promoting sustained and broadly shared prosperity.

Missing from this literature, however, is the perspective of community-based organisations in this process. The ToC approach, with its focus on continuous critical reflection, provides an opportunity for improved and extended learning in development thinking and practice.

While all partners involved with Peduli are aiming for the same outcomes, understandings of how change will happen, and emphasis in what areas, are diverse. When Peduli's second phase was designed in early 2014, a social inclusion approach was central, based on the literature that social inclusion promotes poverty reduction for those who have been excluded, a clear Theory of Change had yet to be articulated. This paper aims to contribute to filling that gap in knowledge by providing answers to the following questions:

1. What types of social exclusion are experienced, and what are the most and least common types?
2. What types of actors are involved in exclusion, and which are regarded as the most important?
3. What types of stakeholders are involved in inclusion, and which are regarded as the most important?
4. As categorized by Peduli's three outcomes, what types of social change are envisioned, and what are the most and least important?

This analysis is then developed into a concluding discussion on how Peduli's partners consider that positive social change can be most effectively generated in each of Peduli's pillars.

Conceptual Background

Social Inclusion is the process of improving the ability, opportunity, and dignity of people, disadvantaged on the basis of their identity, to take part in society. (World Bank, 2013 p.4)

Historically, the concept of social exclusion goes back at least as far as Aristotle (Sen, 2000), but it only came to prominence in the mid-1970s as European policy makers attempted to realign discourses relating to poverty and increased demand for state social insurance resulting from rising unemployment (Mathieson et al., 2008). Over the following decades, in Europe at least, 'exclusion' increasingly replaced 'poverty' as a more politically expedient problem associated with the dominance of market forces (Silver, 1994). In this, the concept can be seen to be more political than analytical (Øyen, 1997), and although social exclusion can and often does intersect with material deprivation, particularly persistent poverty (Mosse, 2007), the two should not be conflated. Whilst inequality and poverty are outcomes, social exclusion is both an outcome and a process (World Bank 2013 op. cit.).

An early attempt to extend the relevance of the concept globally, an International Institute for Labour Studies (IILS) research programme, was clear in its determination that social exclusion – and its converse, social inclusion – varies according to institutional, political, historical and geographical contexts (International Institute for Labour Studies,

1998). Social exclusion can therefore be seen to be multidimensional, dynamic and relational, and is as much associated with civil and political rights as with economic and social rights (Gore and Figueiredo, 1997). It operates at various social levels, encompassing political, cultural and economic dimensions, affecting people in different ways at different times, and is often the result of unequal power relations. The outcome of social exclusion is not necessarily that affected individuals or communities are poor, but that they are prevented from participating fully in the economic, social, and political life of the society in which they live (Young, 2000).

Aside from structural economic exclusion from the labour market and related material deprivations, social exclusion can be understood to result in an inability to exercise basic social rights (Mayes et al., 2001; Atkinson et al., 2002). It may therefore encompass exclusion from healthcare, education, state social benefits, public facilities, and entitlements of citizenship such as access to democratic and judicial processes. (Silver, 1994 op. cit.). De Haan (1998) suggests that social exclusion is characterized by the inability of groups or individuals to participate in the basic political, economic and social functioning of society.

A World Bank report (op. cit.) suggests that three intersecting domains – markets (i.e. land, housing, labour, and credit markets), services (e.g. health, education, social welfare, and transport), and spaces

(which have a social, political, and cultural character that solidifies processes of exclusion) – represent both barriers to and opportunities for inclusion, and intervening in one domain without consideration of the others is an important factor in the limited success of many policies and programs aimed at addressing exclusion.

Garcia Roca's (1998) addition of a contextual dimension relating to the possibility of exclusion from family and the community points further towards the relational nature of social exclusion: exclusion is an attribute of the connections and relations between individuals and groups, rather than anything that is inherent or absolute to the excluder or the excluded. Aside from what has been called 'vertical' exclusion – the ability of individuals to take part in society – exclusion can be 'horizontal', operating within heterogeneous groups. Migrants as a group might find themselves excluded on arrival in a new territory, for example, but exclusion can also occur within the migrant group itself.

This relational perspective has two dimensions (Mathieson et al., 2008 *op. cit.*). One focuses on unequal social relationships characterised by differential power relations which result from the way societies are organised. The other focuses on the breakdown of relationships between people and society resulting in a lack of participation, protection, integration and power. Mann's analysis (1986 p.2) clearly sets the role of human groups in 'social power networks' as central, with exclusion being the product of an unequal balance of power between social groups. Taking this approach into consideration, a relational perspective implies the need to examine the hierarchical nature of social systems, the assumptions of political actors, and the role of institutions (Fleury, 1998).

In this context, emphasizing the role of the relational features of social exclusion in the experience of poverty, Sen (*op. cit.*) draws a distinction between

'active' and 'passive' exclusion. He suggests that a group might be deliberately excluded from society, or a group might be excluded as an unintended consequence of poorly conceived or executed policy. In either case, as Estivill (2003) argues, any state-led processes may be reinforced by cultural and symbolic factors. Dominant institutions may apply negative attributes which are then used to legitimize exclusion and the subsequent repression and even stigmatisation of particular individuals or groups.

Social exclusion may then be understood as an accumulation of processes which distances and places individuals, groups and communities in a position of inferiority in relation to prevailing centres of power, resources and values (Estivill, 2003:19 *op. cit.*). Room (1995 *op. cit.*) suggests that the core of the concept lies in inadequate social participation, and a subsequent lack of social protection, social integration and power, which at worst can manifest as organized violence against those excluded.

Individuals and groups are often excluded or included based on their identity (Eyben, 2004). The most common group identities resulting in exclusion relate to gender, race, caste, ethnicity, religion, age and disability status (World Bank, 2013 *op. cit.*). Medical conditions (e.g. HIV/AIDS) and sexual orientation may also form the basis for exclusion, as may spatial factors concerned with disparities between geographically advantaged and disadvantaged areas (Kanbur and Venables, 2005). Migrants often find themselves excluded (Kothari, 2002). However, it must be recognised that identity is not singular and static, and individuals may be excluded, or included, on the basis of just one of their identities. Similarly, individuals are nearly always members of different groups, and may find themselves excluded from one, but not another. Any nuanced understanding of exclusion must therefore take into account the notion of 'intersectionality': an understanding that people with multiple identities are

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simultaneously situated in a number of social structures and realms, and the intersections can produce a multiple advantages or disadvantages (World Bank, 2013 *op. cit*. p.6).

Stressing that social inclusion is central to building and maintaining prosperity, and ensuring that development gains are equitably distributed, a recent World Bank report proposes defining social inclusion in two ways (*ibid*.). Broadly, with the stated intention of guiding policy makers, it suggests that social inclusion is 'the process of improving the terms for individuals and groups to take part in society' (p.3). A second definition, which is intended to address how those terms can be more specifically improved, states that social inclusion is 'the process of improving the ability, opportunity, and dignity of people, disadvantaged on the basis of their identity, to take part in society' (p.4).

Drawing on these definitions, Peduli's over-arching assumption is that meaningful and sustainable poverty reduction among the socially excluded requires changes in the social structures that govern access to resources and economic opportunities. Specific definitions of social inclusion which shaped the design of Peduli include:

- Social inclusion is the process of building social relations and respect for individuals and communities so they are able to participate fully in decision making, in economic, social, political, and cultural life, and have equitable access to and control over resources (to meet basic needs) in order to enjoy a standard of welfare considered decent within their society[1].
- Social inclusion furthers the ideals, values, and goals of freedom, equality, democracy, and recognition. Social inclusion has four corresponding end points: capability, distributive justice, participation, and human rights[2].

This study follows Peduli's conceptual underpinnings in its mapping and analysis of the processes associated with social exclusion. It goes beyond the concept and realities of poverty and marginalization to investigate the relationships between the excluded and excluders, and among stakeholders, particularly those who hold political power. Diagnosing the root causes of exclusion involves examining potential changes in the social relations that govern access to resources and economic opportunities, determining how social change might happen, and identifying the factors perceived as key to success. The study therefore aims to tease out the existing dimensions of social exclusion with the objective of providing an analysis which identifies the strategies that are most likely to foster social inclusion.

The study will identify the key actors involved in social exclusion, and specify the ways in which the early and intermediate outcomes, which relate to achieving the desired long-term changes, will be brought about and documented. In focusing on why certain outcomes obtain for certain groups, and identifying the actors and processes of those outcomes, the over-arching objective of the study is to determine which forms of contestation and collaboration will be most effective in convening and fostering the dialogue that will strengthen social relations between excluded groups and their communities, local government officials, policy makers and the state.

A number of complexities can be anticipated in any investigation into the multidimensional and relational processes associated with social exclusion. At the simplest level, some individuals and even entire groups may not appear in official statistics, or may be 'invisible' within their own communities. Determining the existence, let along the extent, of such groups self-evidently will be difficult. For these groups, and more broadly, it may also be challenging to investigate

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[1] World Bank PSF (2013), Peduli Phase II Design
[2] Silver (2012) Background Paper for the World Bank Informing the Design of PNPM Peduli

a subjective, personal dimension of exclusion which concerns social confidence, self-esteem and personal fulfilment (Roca, 1998 *op. cit.*). Appadurai (2004) points to the importance of the 'capacity to aspire' in the context of moving towards inclusion, and the importance of role models and reference groups in escaping exclusion, or remaining locked within it. Conversely what Elmslie and Sedo (1996) call 'learned helplessness' can turn a single negative event, such as an episode of discrimination, into the first step of years of exclusion and then self-exclusion.

Exclusionary practices in one domain may lead to or reinforce exclusion in another domain, and untangling the 'dynamic sequence of interventions' (Silver, 2013) required is anticipated to be challenging. It needs to be recognised that some forms of deprivation may reinforce situations of exclusion (Sen, 2000 *op. cit.*), that the inclusion of some groups may reinforce the exclusion of others (Silver, 2007), and that disadvantages associated with exclusion can accrue. Being excluded today may trap an individual, or a group, in a position that offers little prospect of escaping exclusion in the future. In considering the spaces in which social exclusion exists, such as state institutions, the market, the community and the family, it also needs to be recognised that unequal access can as effectively represent exclusion as a complete denial of access (Cornwall, 2004).

Doubtlessly too, social exclusion is dynamic. Although moving from exclusion to inclusion (or vice versa) rarely happens overnight, rapid and very real processes of migration, industrialization and urbanization mean that the picture is constantly shifting, and representations in mass media can have rapid and unexpected effects, potentially both positive and negative (Trujillo and Paluck, 2012). In this, it needs to be accepted that this study has a temporal dimension: what is the case today will not necessarily be the case tomorrow.

The concept of social inclusion is easy to grasp, but challenging to implement. Progressive change requires contestation and collaboration among a wide range of interest groups, not all of whom are interested in the collective good. There are also different types of inclusion: inclusive processes and inclusive outcomes. As social inclusion in the context of poverty reduction is primarily about the accountability of the state to its citizens, engaged dialogue is required which strengthens social relations between excluded groups and their surrounding community, local government officials, policy makers and the state. Facilitating social inclusion is therefore as much about creating and occupying political space, as it is about ensuring an equitable share in resources, markets and services.

Methodology

The Theory of Change workshops

Between November 2014 and August 2015, as grants were being awarded, expert facilitators, accompanied by TAF and national partner staff, led one-two-day workshops with each one of 68 civil society organization (CSO) partners to document the Theory of Change (ToC) for each partner and the projects they were to be responsible for. The workshops were held at partner offices, and involved all CSO staff as well as stakeholders and beneficiaries associated with the program. Each workshop was facilitated by one or more subject matter experts who had previously been engaged in discussions about social inclusion with the Peduli team, and included representatives of TAF and other external organizations as active participants. In the workshops each partner mapped relationships between the excluded and excluders, as well as the stakeholders and those who hold political power, with the intention of informing and guiding strategy.

More specifically, the primary objectives of the workshops were to:

- Collect baseline data about the partners' Theories of Change to be used for monitoring and evaluation purposes;
- Provide contestability to the partners' program design through critical views of outsiders;
- Assess the capacity of the partners to plan for appropriate technical assistance.

At the time, TAF solicited feedback from both facilitators and partners about the benefits of the workshops, and more than 85% reported that the process was helpful or very helpful in strengthening their understanding of social exclusion, who and what was causing it, and developing their strategy to address it. In December 2014, TAF convened facilitators and national partners to review the results of the first 24 workshops, which produced a map of partner capabilities and initiated dialogue about how capacity building should take place. As the workshops have continued, they have created a forum for TAF and the national partners to function as reflective partners, openly discussing program achievements and challenges, pro-actively managing risk, and promoting program learning.

Each workshop resulted in a five-page paper, written in a similar format that documented the workshop findings. These papers give a brief description of the target community, and present a table of the areas of social exclusion they face, organized by Peduli's three outcomes. An overview of the program's approach (including a stakeholder map and a description of main activities) was included, followed by a list of three, four or five main areas of social change the program aims to influence. Each paper ends with a list of the key assumptions that the partner was mak-

ing about their ToC. These key assumptions are the basis of TOC of why and how selected approached and program plan result social change. After each workshop, participants completed a survey in which they ranked what they thought were the top three most important key assumptions. The ToC also documented partners' perspective on what kind of capacity building activities needed for each partner to achieve social change based on TOC they made.

Analytical approaches

This study builds on an initial analysis conducted by Jonathan Lassa and Elcid Li to identify possible categories of analysis. It analysed the 68 five-page ToC papers using Atlas.ti (www.atlasti.com), a specialized qualitative data analysis software program which is designed to allow the user to extract, categorize and analyses data from a large variety and volume of source documents with a view to discovering patterns and testing hypotheses. Source data can comprise text documents (such as interviews, articles, reports), images (photos, screen shots, diagrams), audio recordings (interviews, broadcasts, music), video clips (audio-visual material), and geo-location data. The

text of 68 ToC reports were entered into the system, and were then coded with the objective of quantifying the incidence of a number of pre-determined categories derived from the Peduli results framework.

The initial analysis was then critically analysed by a separate team and supplemented by a close reading and annotation of the papers with the intention of discovering 'telling' rather than 'typical' examples of the types of social exclusion experienced, the actors involved in processes of exclusion and inclusion, and the types of social inclusion partners envisaged categorized by the three end of program outcomes: increased access to public services and social assistance; increased fulfilment of human rights; and improved policy on social inclusion. This process also served as a mechanism to check the results produced by the software driven analysis. Some changes were made with to the original data set to better reflect the data in the ToCs, such as grouping together categories to avoid duplication. It is also important to note that this section reflects the views of the CSOs at the time of the ToC. A further analysis looking into if and how the original ToCs had changed would be a worthwhile task at a later stage in the program.

Results and Discussion

What types of socialexclusion are experienced?

This section addresses the following questions: according to the CSOs, what types of social exclusion are experienced, what are the most and least common types of exclusion, and how do these types of exclusion relate to the Peduli pillars? Table 1 below shows the types of social exclusion the 68 CSO partners identified in their ToC papers, the number of times each type was noted, and the Peduli pillars in which each type of exclusion was noted. These are keyed: vulnerable children and youth (C), remote indigenous communities reliant on natural resources (I), discriminated religious minorities (R), victims of gross human rights violations (V), and *waria* (transgender) (W)[3].

Table 1: Ranked Types of Social Exclusion

Rank	Type of Social Exclusion	Number of cases	Pillars with cases
1	Barrier to civil rights (legal identity)	103	C, I, R, V, W
2	Stigmatization	83	C, I, R, V, W
3	Barrier to education	77	C, I, R, V, W
4	Barrier to health services	62	C, I, R, V, W
5	Barrier to livelihoods	55	C, I, R, V, W
6	Geographical isolation	42	C, I, R, V
7	Barrier to freedom of expression	38	I, R, V
8	Exclusion based on gender	36	C, I, R, V, W
9	Security personnel intimidation and violence	35	C, V, W
10	Barrier to religious expression	34	I, R
11	Barrier to social welfare services	33	C, I, R, V
12	Community violence	32	I, V, W
13	Absolute exclusion by the community	31	I, R,
14	Barrier to state job opportunities	31	C, I, R, V, W
15	Community intimidation	30	C, I, R, V, W
16	Self-exclusion	25	C, I, V, W
17	Barrier to indigenous rights	17	I, V
18	Exclusion based on age	15	C
19	Threat of sexual violence	14	C, R, W
20	Exclusion at school	9	C, I, R,
21	Exclusion based on caste/class/race	7	C, I, V,
22	Media bias	4	C, R, V
23	Imprisonment	1	C, W

[3] At the time that the ToC workshops were accomplished, no partners had been engaged to work on Pillar 6 - People with disabilities.

Discussion

Addressing these types of exclusion as ranked, a more qualitative interpretation of the ToC papers provides more nuanced data, particularly with respect to the common and varying types of exclusion experienced in the different Peduli pillars.

Barrier to civil rights (legal identity)

This type of discrimination was reported by partners working in all of Peduli's pillars under consideration, but it was reported to occur most often amongst religious minorities. This pillar also was reported most frequently to lack all three forms of legal identity – the KTP identity card, the birth certificate (*Akta Kelahiran*) and the KK family card (*Kartu Keluarga*). Examples include a Hindu group living in a Muslim and Christian dominated area on Bima district of West Nusa Tenggara Province which was reported to have their applications for KTP identity cards ignored by local officials, along with applications for birth certificates, marriage certificates (*Akta Pernikahan*), and KK family cards. The latter are important documents which identify household heads and family members, including children who have the right to obtain a KTP identity card at 17 years of age. Similar issues were reported in South Sulawesi relating to followers of animist Ammatoa beliefs, and in West Java among followers of Ahmadiyah, a minority Islamic group, and the Dayak Losarang, an indigenous belief group.

The issue was reported to occur less frequently among remote indigenous communities. It was however reported that amongst a hierarchical indigenous group on Sumba island, the higher ranking members prevented, or made it difficult, for lower ranking members to obtain KTP identity cards. In Bengkulu, it was reported that some children working on the street lacked birth certificates which would make obtaining KTP identity cards later in life difficult, and this lack was also reported to occur among children of migrant workers, children born into remote indigenous communities, and religious minorities. If a parent, or both of them, lack official identity documents, it can be impossible to obtain a birth certificate for a child and other services. In south Kalimantan, access to KTP identity cards was reportedly 'made difficult' by judges dealing with juvenile cases determined to be 'complicated'.

Similarly, in some cases *waria* were reported to have difficulty accessing KTP identity cards, the CSOS reported this was largely because they lacked access to the required KK family card, which was held by their families from whom they were estranged. Victims of human rights abuses, and their families, were reported to be less concerned about access to legal identity, but in Lampung, victims and their families of the 1989 Talangsari attack (when a minority Islamic group were attacked by military forces) are reported to be prohibited from paying taxes. In this case, central government was so determined to erase the even from history that the name of the village was changed.

Stigmatization

There is a correlation between state stigma and stigma from the wider community. Within the excluded community itself, stigmatization occurs at a number of levels. In the case of remote indigenous communities particularly, a distinction needs to be made between stigmatization of the indigenous group by external groups, and stigmatization of individuals and groups inside the community by the community. Regarding the former, indigenous groups are often considered *sesat* (misguided) because they have cultural beliefs and rituals that do not conform with the prevailing norms. In West Java, for example, the Ahmadiyah minority, particularly the women, are reported to experience verbal abuse, and the children

to be subject to stigmatization by teachers and peers at school. This has resulted in exclusion from market spaces with members being reported to be forced to shop for goods, or sell their produce, in other areas. Likewise, in South Sulawesi, the animist Ammatoa, reputedly practitioners of black magic, are reported to be seen as 'objects of entertainment' and subject to derogatory comments. In West Java, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), Indonesia's top Muslim clerical body, have officially declared the Dayak Losarang lost (*sesat*). However, whilst the Topo Uma in Central Sulawesi are reported to be regarded as backwards, stupid, and a source of cheap labour by outsiders, an internal hierarchy stigmatizes lower ranked members of the community, and some women. Similarly, on Sumba island, a hierarchical group stigmatizes the lower ranked, leading to their limited involvement in local level decision making.

Victims of human rights abuses, and their families, are regularly reported to suffer stigmatization, often as a result of events that occurred decades ago. In Medan, as in other parts of Indonesia, those accused and convicted of being members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in the mid-1960s, were reported to be still referred to as '*TaPol*' (*tahanan politik* - political detainee), despite the government changing the requirement for this to be marked on KTP identity cards in 2001, and may still be obliged to report to the police periodically. The victims of 1965, as well as their children and grandchildren, can also still find themselves unable to gain employment in government organisations, and even to be unwelcome in their local mosques. Similarly, victims of the 1989 Talangsari attack, particularly women and the children of those involved, were reported to continue to suffer stigmatization by the police and local military forces. Regarding the victims of the riots in Jakarta in 1998, perceptions were reported to exist among the community that the victims are not entirely innocent, and that they must have done something to cause their own misfortune.

Mixed messages emerge from CSOs working with vulnerable children. In Bengkulu it was reported that following incarceration, young offenders are not excluded from local community, including schools, and there is little stigmatization that prevents reintegration. However, in Jakarta, young offenders are reported to be stigmatized and, labelled as 'criminals', are prevented from returning to education following their release. Reports from South Kalimantan, which has strong Islamic influences, suggest that vulnerable children there are stigmatized for not adhering to moral norms, and are labelled as lazy, beggars and criminals, likely to cause trouble and disturb the peace. This echoes the level of stigmatization experienced by children in other sites.

Waria are also reported to face stigmatization in the more devoutly Islamic areas of Indonesia particularly. In Aceh, which operates under a Sharia legal system, *waria* are considered haram (illegitimate or forbidden). The law prevents them from organizing as a group, and insists that they must dress as men, and non-provocatively. Often regarded erroneously as sex workers, and banned from entertainment districts, instances were reported of *waria* being referred to as 'a virus' and the root of all social problems.

Barriers to education, health services and livelihoods

The lack of legal identity, as discussed above, can have a calamitous and domino effect on access to public services. Without a birth certificate for example, a child may be prevented from registering for school. Similarly, without a KTP identity card, an individual is not going to be able to register for *Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (Jamkesmas)*, the national health insurance system.

More specifically, the ToCs claim that no education is made available to young offenders if they are detained pending trial. Furthermore, health services

were reported to be limited in detention centres, and no rehabilitation, reintegration or counselling services are made available to young people on release. As noted above, in some areas (Bengkulu) young offenders were not reported to be explicitly barred from school on release (although some self-exclude as they do not want to re-enter school below their age group and risk stigmatization as a result of their incarceration being recorded on their school file), whilst in other areas (Jakarta and South Kalimantan) they may be prevented from re-enrolling. In any case, stigmatized as 'criminals', many young offenders find it difficult to obtain any sort of formal employment following their release.

In many cases, remote indigenous communities were reported to find that their access to education, health services and livelihoods was constrained purely as a result of geographical isolation (as discussed below). The Topo Uma in Central Sulawesi, for example, were reported to lack health services in their village, and suffer poor education opportunities. As among other remote indigenous groups, banking services, public transport and access to markets for agricultural products were also reported to be limited, along with livelihoods related services such as government agricultural extension programs.

Discriminated religious minorities can find their access to education, health services and livelihoods similarly constrained by geography, but may also find themselves subject to more active social exclusion. The Ammatoa in south Sulawesi, and the Ahmadiyah in West Java, for example, were both reported to be subject to discriminatory treatment when accessing health services, and children to suffer verbal abuse from teachers. As noted above, the Ahmadiyah are also reported to be discriminated against when selling goods at market, with purchasers preferring not to buy from them. In some cases, it was reported that their produce was regarded as *haram*.

Victims of gross human rights violations are reported in these ToC papers to lack access to health, education, banking and social welfare services, and many suffer economic difficulty as a result of the death, incarceration, and/or stigmatization of a significant breadwinner in the past. Some victims of the Talangsari attack are reported to even lack access to electricity and water, and it was reported that infrastructure such as roads is being deliberately denied.

The experience of *waria* varies widely according to the ToC papers. In Aceh, they can experience very limited access to health services and government employment opportunities. By way of contrast, in South Kalimantan it was reported that it is possible for *waria* to obtain employment in government offices.

Geographical isolation

Geographical isolation is self-evidently a problem that relates most significantly to remote communities. The Topo Uma in Central Sulawesi, for example, who are mostly farmers and live in a geographically isolated area only accessible by narrow and unpaved tracks suitable for motorcycles, were reported to be obliged to use funds intended for agriculture improvement to improve transport links. However, discriminated religious minorities and victims of human rights violations can also find themselves affected. In the case of the former, a type of self-exclusion may occur, or the group may have been forced by hostility into a more remote area. In the case of the latter, the victims may suffer deliberate isolation as national or local government fails to provide infrastructure such as roads. Victims of the Talangsari attack, for example, are reported to be geographically isolated as a result of a lack of paved roads and official unwillingness to provide transport and other infrastructure. In any case, geographical isolation can result in limited access to health services, education and livelihoods, and

from the point of view of less-than-willing service providers, it can usefully render isolated communities less visible and so less of a concern.

Barrier to freedom of expression

Barriers to freedom of expression covers a variety of exclusions, and there may be some crossover with barriers to religious expression. In the case of the Ammatoa in south Sulawesi, for example, barriers related to religion reportedly extend to barriers related to political, social and cultural freedom. Similarly, it was reported that Ahmadiyah groups in West Java, who appear most obviously to suffer religious discrimination, also find that their freedom to express political and cultural views inhibited. It was also reported that groups such as the Dayak Losarang in West Java, who find themselves excluded from village meetings due to stigmatization, have little chance to express themselves politically.

On Sumba island, a hierarchical group is reported to repress the freedom of expression of the lower ranked members. It was reported that victims of human rights violations, such as those arrested for being members of the PKI in the late 1960s, or accused of such, may never actually have been members of the PKI, and certainly cannot be assumed to have left wing views today, yet they were reported to continue to face barriers to expressing political views, as do their children and grand-children. The stigmatization faced by the victims of human rights abuses also extends to the accusation of being communists without religion. This is a particularly negative stigmatization, and one that runs through many of the pillars, particularly so in post-*reformasi* Indonesia.

It is however *waria* groups that were reported in these ToC papers to experience barriers to freedom of expression most explicitly. Some individuals were reported to be so constrained in their freedom of expression that they were not prepared to admit to being *waria*. It is also interesting to note, however, that in south Kalimantan, the ToCs noted that vulnerable children were reported to form their own sub-cultural groups such as metallica, punk, emo, and *pengamen* ('buskers'). These groups may be disapproved of by older and more conservative groups, but their existence indicates that some barriers to freedom of expression can be overcome.

Exclusion based on gender

Waria, who in some parts of Indonesia, are legally obliged to conform to 'normal' social standards, most obviously face exclusion based on gender, including by their families. Many *waria* were reported to be estranged from their families. Among the indigenous Topo Uma in Central Sulawesi, it was reported that women are discriminated against inside the group, and female Ahmadiyah members, who are often responsible for buying or selling in public markets, were reported to be specific targets of verbal abuse by outsiders in West Java. Women in these groups may therefore experience a form of 'double exclusion' in that they are part of an excluded minority and are often further excluded by their own minority group. It should be noted that barriers to health services (for reasons of geographical remoteness or lack of formal identity papers, for example) will very likely affect women more badly during pregnancy, childbirth, and postpartum. Similarly, women, in terms of inheritance rights, for example, are likely to be disadvantaged by the inability to access formal marriage certificates. It may also be the case that women are less resilient to stigmatization. Females associated with victims of the Talangsari attack were reported to be particularly affected.

Security personnel intimidation and violence

In this case, security personnel were reported to include military forces, along with officers from

POLRI, the national police forces, Satpol PP – the Civil Service Police Unit, a local governmental law-enforcement body – and prison officers. Violence and intimidation by these groups affect individuals and groups in all of Peduli's pillars under consideration.

Violence and intimidation by the police against young people arrested or held without charge was reported to be common during the interrogation process, and to occur in temporary detention, and in correctional facilities, including as a result of actions by other detainees. *Waria* were also reported in these ToC papers to suffer harassment, abuse and violence from national and local police officers, particularly if the police are pressed to take action by members of the public.

Violence and intimidation by security personnel is not explicitly reported against remote indigenous communities or religious minorities in these ToC papers, but lack of protection of these groups by security personnel is reported to be an issue in the case of intimidation by non-official groups and in religious-cultural conflicts, especially those occurring in remote regions when access and rights to land is at issue.

Barrier to religious expression

Considering barriers to religious expression, it needs to be noted that many religious minorities, particularly those living in remote areas, enjoy freedom to worship in their own communities, but face discrimination out of them. At worst, it can be the case that external groups intrude on the minorities' territory, with a view to intimidating them. On Bima district, for example, in an area with a history of friction between Hindus and Muslims, the local Forum Umat Islam (FUI) demanded that a Hindu temple be removed. These calls were however ignored by local government.

As noted above, under stigmatization, Dayak Losarang minorities in West Java, and the Ammatoa in

South Sulawesi, both experience derogatory comments from those outside their communities, and the Ahmadiyah in West Java have both been the subject of an MUI *fatwa*, and attacks by hardline Islamic groups led the government to close Ahmadiyah mosques. Whilst stigmatization may not in itself form a barrier to religious expression, such violence and officially sanctioned discriminatory actions clearly do.

Barrier to social welfare services

In this context, social welfare services refer to social safety net schemes, including *Raskin* (subsidized rice for the poor), *Jamkesmas* (health fee waivers for the poor), and support such as stipends to cover school fees. The CSOs reported that remote indigenous communities and victims of gross human rights violations experience the most severe barriers, often as a result of their inability to access the official identity documents required to register for such schemes. Victims of the 1998 riots in Jakarta, for example, are also reported to have limited access to *Jamkesmas* and *Raskin*, and the same holds true for those accused and convicted of being members of the PKI in Medan in the late 1960s.

Stigmatization and prejudice also work against victims of human rights violations in their attempts to access social welfare services, and geographical isolation and lack of visibility can also set up barriers for remote communities. Other groups such as vulnerable children and youth, and discriminated religious minorities, can also find themselves facing significant barriers to social welfare services as a result of not having the required identity documents. On Sumba island, it is reported that higher ranked members of a hierarchical group have better access to village level government and so control access to government social welfare programs. In this case the barriers are internal to the group.

Community violence

Community violence was reported to be directed most substantially at remote indigenous communities, discriminated religious minorities, and *waria*. Remote communities can experience organized violence in the case of conflicts over land particularly, and as noted above, the Ahmadiyah in West Java have been attacked by hardline Islamic groups on several occasions. Some *waria* were reported to have suffered violence in their families whilst growing up, and in Banjarmarsin, the Forum Pembela Islam (FPI) are known to at least threaten violence against them. It is also reported that security personnel do not always respond appropriately when marginalized groups are threatened by, or subject to, community violence.

Absolute exclusion by the community

In the most extreme case, a community may become totally disconnected from wider society. Individuals may also experience this type of exclusion, but an element of self-exclusion is very often involved. By far the majority of cases reported regarding excluded groups concerned discriminated religious minorities, although a smaller number of instances were reported to affect remote indigenous communities. This was reported to be the case for the Dayak Losarang in West Java, for example, who do not associate themselves with a specific religion, faith system or political party, and as a result have been subjected to a fatwa by the MUI declaring the group to be sesat. Consequently, they live largely outside the law, are uninvolved in local level political or social events, and have little or no access to legal identity and social services. Similarly, the Jama'ah Ahmadiyah (JAI), have been attacked several times by hardline Islamic groups leading the government to close JAI mosques, and JAI individuals regularly experience social and verbal abuse when out of their area. On Lombok island, another Ahmadiyah group who were driven out of their original homes had to move again after their houses were burned down less than a year later, and are now housed in temporary accommodation in the provincial capital. In Central Java, the Samin, who also subscribe to a religion that is not recognized by the state, are excluded to the degree that only 10% of the children attend school. There is however an element of self-exclusion in this in that they believe that contact with outsiders will destroy their role as the preservers of their ancestors' religion.

Barrier to state job opportunities

Any individual without a KTP identity card will find it difficult if not impossible to obtain a job with a state organization. It is also the case that state job opportunities will be fewer in geographically remote areas. That said, victims of human rights violations and *waria* are reported to experience the most significant barriers in this area.

Community intimidation

Community intimidation is taken to be a lesser form of community violence, and a more extreme form of stigmatization. Victims of human rights violations, religious minorities, and *waria* were reported to experience this form of exclusion most significantly. Those accused of being members of the PKI in Medan in the late 1960s, who are currently not allowed to participate in religious and social activities associated with the local mosque, were reported to be affected, as were a Hindu group on predominantly Muslim Bima District when threatened by FUI demands for the removal of their temple. *Waria* in more Islamic areas such as Aceh were reported to be expected to conform to 'normal' social standards, and to be not allowed to create organisations or activities. Similarly, in South Kalimantan, some entertainment centres ban *waria* from entering. Remote indigenous communities were reported to experience community

intimidation less frequently as they have less contact with external groups. Women may experience community intimidation more badly, particularly if they are required to visit markets to buy and/or to sell goods outside their communities. At worst community intimidation can result in absolute exclusion by the community as mentioned above, or self-exclusion, which is discussed next.

Self-exclusion

A combination of stigmatization and intimidation and violence by security personnel and the community can result in an individual's or a group's self-exclusion. A Hindu group on predominantly Moslem Bima district, for example, is reported to be expected to 'lay low' in order to not provoke trouble. A different dimension was reported concerning some of those accused of being members of the PKI in the late 1960s who are refusing to use government services until their status as victims is officially recognized. Following conviction and incarceration, some vulnerable children and youth were reported to self-exclude from school on the basis that they are embarrassed to have to repeat a year with younger children. The violence that they were reported to be subjected to, both physical and emotional, can also catastrophically affect their sense of self-worth. Similar fears and emotions affect some *waria*, who largely live within the *waria* community, and others who do not admit to being *waria* in public.

Barrier to indigenous rights

Indigenous rights extend beyond the most basic human rights to include the preservation of indigenous lands, languages and religion. Self-evidently, remote indigenous communities are most likely to face barriers to indigenous rights, and there is an overlap in this study with barriers to religious freedom. The most pervasive threats to indigenous rights, as reported by

all partners working with remote indigenous communities reliant on natural resources, relate to threats to land rights. Both the expansion of national parks, and the activities of commercial organizations seeking to extract minerals or develop agricultural plantations, create issues around land tenure which in many cases lead to violent conflict, and can have severe effects on indigenous groups dependent on the land and related natural resources for livelihoods. Issues relating to languages, cultures and traditions were reported to have far less prominence, although some groups were reported to be seeking rights to restore their cultures and traditions.

Exclusion based on age

All reported cases of exclusion based on age relate to vulnerable children and youth, and none relate to the elderly. As has been discussed, children are entirely reliant on their families (and access to official family documentation) in order to obtain an identity card of their own, and any breakdown in family relations can have a deleterious effect on this process. It should be noted that the lack of education and rehabilitation services for incarcerated children is likely to have a more significant effect on them than on convicted adults, as will violence and ill-treatment.

Threat of sexual violence

Threats of sexual violence were reported exclusively relating to *waria*, although in extreme events, such as those associated with the Jakarta riots in 1998 when hundreds of cases of rape were reported to have occurred against women, it is doubtlessly a concern for other groups such as the Military zone of Aceh. *Waria* were reported to experience sexual harassment and violence from the external non-*waria* community, from peers at school during adolescence, and from other waria. In Central Kalimantan, extreme Islamic groups were reported to have organized group violence against *waria*.

Exclusion at school

This type of exclusion relates to exclusion at school, rather than exclusion from school (and other education services) as noted above. In Jakarta it was reported that children released from detention who do return to school can find themselves stigmatized by teachers and their peers. Similarly, children brought up in Ammatoa households in South Sulawesi were reported to be subjected to verbal abuse by teachers, and those who are part of the Ahmadiyah community in West Java were reported to be discriminated against by teachers and peers. Children of the victims of the 1989 Talangsari attack in Lampung, and even the grandchildren of those accused of being members the PKI in the late 1960s, were also reported to suffer stigmatization at school. Many *waria* were also reported to have been subjected to discrimination and verbal abuse since childhood, including when at school.

Exclusion based on caste/class/race

The most explicit cases of exclusion based on caste/class/race were reported from East Sumba where a hierarchical group maintains three strata comprised of 'royalty', 'common' members and 'slaves'. With the higher ranked members controlling village level government, and access to resources, including land and government social welfare services, the lower ranked members are severely disadvantaged. Similarly, the Topo Uma in Central Sulawesi maintain an internal hierarchy that stigmatizes lower ranked members of the community. Migrant workers, and particularly the children of absent migrant workers, can be stigmatized and excluded on the basis of discrimination that is essentially class based. Ethnically Chinese Indonesians have experienced systematic and structured discrimination in the past, and the Cina Benteng from Banten, who are generally dark skinned and poor, were reported to experience discrimination even by other ethnically Chinese Indonesians.

Media bias

Through biased reporting, the media (television, radio, and print media news mainly) was reported to have potentially significant effects on processes associated with exclusion. In December 2007 and July 2010, for example, the ToC reported to be the case regarding attacks by hardline Islamic groups on Ahmadiyah groups in in West Java. Vulnerable children working on the streets were also reported to have been treated unsympathetically, as have some victims of past human rights violations.

Imprisonment

Imprisonment was reported to be a factor in exclusion specifically in the case of vulnerable children and youth. With a record of conviction and incarceration, young people can be excluded from school in some areas, and may also self-exclude due to actual or potential stigmatization.

Discussion

Considering the Peduli pillars representing socially excluded target groups, and the types of exclusion identified above, the following summary can be presented.

Vulnerable children and youth

Whilst vulnerable children and youth self-evidently experience exclusion based on age, they also experience barriers to civil rights (particularly legal identity), education (particularly when incarcerated), health services, welfare services and, as a result of stigmatization, formal state and private sector employment opportunities. They may lack official identity documents as a result of estrangement from their families, or because their parents lacked the documents necessary to apply for them. They may self-exclude, and may experience intimidation and threatened or actual violence by security personnel.

Remote indigenous communities reliant on natural resources

Remote indigenous communities experience exclusion as a result of geographical isolation, barriers to indigenous rights and are very likely to be stigmatized by external groups. This can result in barriers to civil rights (particularly legal identity), education, health services, livelihoods, social welfare services, and state job opportunities. Within their own communities, they can enjoy freedom of expression and religious expression, but they also experience intimidation and violence from external groups, including corporate actors, and intimidation and violence from security personnel, particularly when land tenure is at issue.

Discriminated religious minorities

Discriminated religious minorities self-evidently experience barriers to freedom of religious expression. At worst, they may experience intimidation and violence from external groups including security personnel. They may also suffer stigmatization and barriers to civil rights (particularly legal identity), education, health services, livelihoods, social welfare services, and state job opportunities.

Victims of gross human rights violations

Victims of gross human rights violations suffer badly from stigmatization, which can lead to geographical isolation and absolute exclusion by the community. They may experience intimidation and violence from external groups including security personnel, and suffer barriers to civil rights (particularly legal identity), education, health services, livelihood opportunities, social welfare services, and state job opportunities.

Waria (transgender)

Waria evidently experience exclusion based on gender and stigmatization, and consequently face barriers to livelihood opportunities. At worst they suffer violence, sexual violence and intimidation by security personnel. They may experience barriers to civil rights (particularly legal identity) often as a result of being unable to access official documentation held by their family, from whom they may be estranged. There appears to be no explicit barriers to health services and social welfare services, but self-exclusion occurs.

What types of actors are involved in exclusion?

This section addresses the following questions: What types of actors are involved in exclusion, and which are regarded as the most important? Table 2 below shows the types of exclusion actors the 68 CSO partners identified in their ToC papers, and the number of times each type was noted. It presents further data that allows better understanding of the types of social exclusion that are experienced, and their causes. The table is derived from a different coding regime than that used to create Table 1. There are some direct correlations. 'Intimidation and violence by security personnel' in Table 1, for example, presents here as 'Security personnel'. However not all instances of 'Barriers to education' in Table 1, for example, were attributed by the CSOs to state actors (i.e. central and local government). This table therefore should be read as additional to Table 1, and not a reworking of the same data.

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Table 2: Ranked Exclusion Actors

Rank	Type of Exclusion Actor	Number of cases
1	Central government	173
2	Community	161
3	Local government	146
4	Security personnel	35
5	Extremist groups	30
6	Sel	25
7	Communit and religious leaders	19
8	Family	15
9	Corporate entities	14
10	School authorities	9
11	Media organizations	4
12	Community facilitators	2

Addressing these types of exclusion actor as ranked, the following observations provide further information on them, and the relevance they have to exclusion in the different Peduli pillars.

Central government

Central government was reported to be an actor in creating barriers to civil rights, particularly legal identity, which was ranked first in Table 1. This type of exclusion affects all of Peduli's pillars under consideration. Vulnerable children and youth, remote indigenous communities, discriminated religious minorities, victims of gross human rights violations, and *waria* all face significant barriers to accessing legal identity documents, including birth certificates, KK family cards, and most importantly KTP identity cards, which are usually obtained at 17 years of age. Without this document it is impossible to get married officially, to register for social welfare services including free or subsidized healthcare, to apply for state jobs and many private sector ones, to vote, to register a child for school, to open a bank account,

or even to apply for a driving licence. Officially, a KTP number is required to register a SIM card for use on mobile telecommunications networks. Without a KTP one is effectively a non-citizen, invisible even to census takers.

Community

The community was reported to be an actor in matters related to stigmatization, which was ranked second in Table 1. This type of exclusion also affects all of Peduli's pillars under consideration. A distinction needs to be made between stigmatization of one community by another (*waria* being stigmatized by non-*waria*, for example, or a religious group being stigmatized by external groups that are not adherents), and stigmatization within a community (certain members of an indigenous group being stigmatized by other members of the group according to rank, for example, or victims of human rights violations being stigmatized by those who they live among). At worst, community exclusion can manifest as mob violence, but it can also result in individuals or groups being discriminated against in local level political processes, being unable to sell their goods at market, or to worship.

Local government

Since Indonesia's massive program of decentralization began in 1999 (as formalized by Law Number 22 of 1999 and Law Number 32 of 2004), the authority and responsibilities of local government have increased enormously. Essentially, only foreign policy, defence (including the national police), the legal system and monetary policy remain the responsibility of the national government. Different levels of local government – provinces, regencies and cities, and sub-districts, which are divided into *desa* (villages, headed by an elected *kepala desa*) and *kelurahan* (administrative unit, headed by a *lurah*, an appointed civil

servant) – have different responsibilities. Most citizens' interactions with government will today therefore be with local government, very often at the most local level, and barriers to social welfare services, including education and health services (which are ultimately the responsibility of regencies and cities) will therefore be accredited to local government agencies. Likewise, discrimination in allocating funds for transport, water and electricity infrastructure, and access to agricultural extension services will also be seen as the result of action, or inaction, by local government, which again affect all Peduli's pillars under consideration. This contrasts with the barriers reported to civil rights, particularly legal identity, which are accredited to national government.

Security personnel

Security personnel include military forces and officers from POLRI (which fall under the authority of national government), Satpol PP (the local governmental law-enforcement body), and prison officers. Violence, intimidation and inaction by these groups affect individuals and groups in all of Peduli's pillars being examined here. Vulnerable children and youth are reported to be subject to harassment and intimidation by security personnel on the street, and violence in custody. *Waria* are also reported to be unduly targeted. Remote indigenous communities, discriminated religious minorities, and victims of human rights violations are reported to suffer not necessarily from the direct actions of security personnel, but their inaction in the case of violence being threatened against the minority by community groups, including extremists.

Extremist groups

Extremist groups, usually with religious/ political affiliations, were reported to be actors most often in threatened and actual violence against religious minorities, and less frequently in actions against *waria*.

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Such groups may also effectively be 'hired' and may also play a role in threatened and actual violence against remote indigenous groups. In this case, the context often concerns corporate actors seeking access to indigenous land.

Self

Self-exclusion was reported to relate to individuals and groups. The former was reported most often among *waria* and victims of human rights abuses. It can be caused either by extreme forms of stigmatization, for example, or a high level of vulnerability. A small number of children were also reported to self-exclude from school. Parents of children can also exclude their children from school as a result of stigmatization, and the desire to avoid exposure. Regarding groups, some remote indigenous communities and discriminated religious minorities were reported to self-exclude to varying degrees by continuing to inhabit remote locations, and by limiting interactions with non-group members.

Community and religious leaders

Community leaders were reported to be agents of exclusion in limiting access of discriminated groups, such as victims of gross human rights violations and *waria*, to local level political processes, community events and welfare services such as agricultural extension facilities. In many cases, a community leader is the first step in any processes relating to obtaining official authorization relating to legal identity documents, for example, especially if the application is deficient in some way. Community leaders can therefore discriminate within an excluded group, as well as discriminate against a minority group that falls within his or her responsibility.

Religious leaders were reported to exclude, and to incite sometimes violent action, against religious minorities. Examples have already been given of the

MUI, Indonesia's top Muslim clerical body, officially declaring the Dayak Losarang lost (*sesat*), and issuing *fatwas* against the Ahmadiyah. The actions of the FUI against Hindus, and the FPI Forum Pembela Islam against *waria* have also been noted. Even in cases where religious leaders have not actually incited discrimination, their lack of action in countering it can be taken as a form of approval.

Family

Exclusion by family members was reported to occur among *waria*, many of whom are estranged from their families, and to a lesser degree among vulnerable children and youth. Among other consequences, this can have a deleterious effect on the excluded individual's ability to access identity documents.

Corporate entities

The most dramatic actions of corporate entities were reported to be their involvement in tenurial disputes with remote indigenous communities, which can involve their collusion with security personnel and the hiring of intimidating or violent mobs. Otherwise, corporate entities were seen as actors of exclusion in creating barriers relating to financial services and private sector job opportunities.

School authorities

Self-evidently school authorities were reported to be responsible for exclusion at school. Although the practice does not appear to be systematic, some vulnerable children and youth were reported to be barred from school following release from detention, and many report stigmatization by teachers. Some *waria*, and the children of religious minorities and victims of human rights violations, were also reported to experience discrimination and intimidation at school.

Media organizations

Media (paper, print, tv) were reported to exclude through biased reporting, especially regarding conflict directed at remote indigenous communities and discriminated religious minorities. They were also reported to be actors in their confirmation of stigmatization in cases relating to vulnerable children and youth, victims of gross human rights violations and *waria*.

Community facilitators

Community facilitators were reported to discriminate in cases related to access to agricultural extension services and community level political processes.

Discussion

Taking the results presented so far into consideration, specifically Table 1 and Table 2, and the subsequent elucidations and observations, the following responses can be provided relating to the study questions: what types of social exclusion are experienced, what are the most and least common types of exclusion, and how do these types of exclusion relate to the Peduli pillars?

Table 1 ranks 'Barrier to civil rights (legal identity)' as top, and Table 2 ranks 'Central government' as top. As discussed, local government is primarily related to the provision of education, health and other welfare services, and the CSOs see central government as the pre-eminent actor in creating barriers to civil rights, particularly legal identity. This is a clear instance of 'vertical' exclusion: the state inhibiting the ability of individuals and groups to take part in society. As discussed, barriers to accessing official identity documents affect all the groups under consideration, and can have severe consequences on accessing education, health, and other welfare services, as well as employment opportunities and wider, fundamental civil rights such as eligibility to vote. It is important to note too that these barriers are sustaining one of the most powerful forms of exclusion in Indonesia: if a parent lacks identity documents, their children are unlikely to gain access. This lack of legal identity (which as noted includes birth certificates, KTP identity cards and KK family cards) goes some way to explaining the barriers nearly all groups under consideration experience in accessing education, health services and livelihoods, which are ranked third, fourth and fifth respectively in Table 1, and social welfare services and state job opportunities, which are ranked 11th and 14th respectively. It is hard to overstate the importance of this lack of legal identity in creating and maintaining social exclusion in Indonesia. It is the case, for example, that an individual who cannot present valid identity documents is more likely to face intimidation by security personnel, and indeed that an individual or a group who requires the services security personnel provide, is unlikely to receive it, or even request it, if they are not in possession of valid identity documents.

The second ranked items in Table 1 and Table 2 — 'Stigmatization' and 'Community' respectively — can also be connected, and also affect all of the groups in the Peduli pillars under consideration. Stigmatization arises primarily as a result of community actions against both external groups, and internal group members that do not conform to community norms. In this it can be seen as an instance of community 'horizontal' exclusion, standing in contrast to vertical, state-led processes of exclusion. The nature, extent and intensity of stigmatization can vary widely. In its milder forms it presents as media bias, which is ranked at the bottom of Table 1, or an almost unnoticeable, unstated avoidance of one individual or group by others. In more severe forms, it presents as community intimidation and violence and absolute exclusion by the community, which are ranked 15th, 12th and 13th respectively in Table 1. Stigmatization also can result in barriers to livelihoods, and state and

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private sector jobs, which are ranged fifth and 14th in Table 1, and – in more extreme forms – can result in self-exclusion, which is ranked 16th in Table 1.

It is therefore suggested that two main types of exclusion affect all the groups in the Peduli pillars under consideration: state-related vertical exclusion, which sees a potentially catastrophic set of exclusions cascade from the barriers that exist to accessing legal identity documents, and community-related horizontal exclusion, which results in a range of effects associated with stigmatization. Given the almost equal ranking of barriers to legal identity and stigmatization at the top of Table 1 (types of exclusion), and the almost equal ranking of central government and the community at the top of Table 2 (actors of exclusion), it is also suggested that state-related vertical exclusion and community-related horizontal exclusion are related. On the one hand, those without legal identity are more likely to be stigmatized, and are less likely to have recourse to the law in the case of more extreme expressions of it. On the other, those who are stigmatized will experience more severe barriers to accessing legal identity, even to the extent of excluding themselves from any processes associated with seeking it. As well as offering some insight into why social exclusion is so persistent, this analysis offers an explanation as to why barriers to legal identity and stigmatization are issues that relate to all groups in the Peduli pillars under consideration.

Aside from the vertical and horizontal dimensions of exclusion, a further dimension relating to whether the involvement of exclusion actors takes active or passive forms provides a useful entry point to an analysis of the types of exclusion that are not explicitly linked to issues related to legal identity and stigmatization. This dimension concerns both vertically inclined state actors and horizontally inclined community actors.

In the case of geographical isolation, which is ranked sixth in Table 1, this approach raises the issue as to whether such groups as remote indigenous communities, discriminated religious minorities, and in smaller numbers, victims of human rights violations, are isolated as a result of active or passive state action. It may be that such groups have been forced or induced into isolation, or they may always have lived in a remote location, and the state may have acted only passively in not seeking to improve transport infrastructure, for example. Similarly, barriers to freedom of expression, ranked seventh in Table 1, exclusion based on gender, ranked eighth, barriers to religious expression, ranked 10th, and barriers to indigenous rights, ranked 17th, can result from both active and passive state action. Indigenous and gender rights, as well as freedom of expression and freedom of religious expression, can be actively suppressed by the state through laws, police action and possibly the judicial system, or they can be inhibited by the state's inaction in the face of threats to these rights. Conversely, it should be noted that the state can also act to promote such rights. As mentioned previously, state security forces can move actively against a group (and did so systematically prior to the *reformasi* era, which began in 1997-1998) or they can stand by inactively and fail to protect those facing threats of, or actual, physical violence, for example. For the most part, the excluded groups in Peduli's pillars suffer from state inaction rather than state action. At the highest level, the Constitution protects all basic human rights, and Indonesia has signed up to international conventions relating to the rights of children and indigenous groups, for example, yet these rights are not available to all citizens, specifically many of those represented by the Peduli pillars. In all but a very few cases, Indonesian law is adequate, but access to it, and implementation of it, especially given the complexities of decentralization, is flawed.

Non-state horizontal exclusion can also take active and passive forms. As has been noted, religious leaders need not incite violence to be culpable; their inaction in failing to condemn it is enough to demonstrate support. Similarly, community facilitators that fail to actively seek out excluded minorities can be seen to be discriminating, and the media bias reported relates largely to perpetuating existing discrimination and stigmatization rather than attempting to counter it, or introducing new forms. More broadly in the community, regarding exclusion based on caste/class/race, or gender, or exclusion by teachers and other authorities at school, only the thinnest of lines exists between those actively stigmatizing and discriminating, and those standing by.

In summary, it is suggested that two main types of exclusion are common to all groups in the Peduli pillars under consideration: state related vertical exclusion, and community related horizontal exclusion. The effects of state barriers to accessing legal identity documents in particular cascade downwards, creating barriers to accessing all sorts of public services.

Furthermore, it is suggested that these two types of exclusion are related: those excluded by the state are more likely to be stigmatized by the community, and these groups in turn therefore experience more numerous and more substantial barriers when seeking access to public services, including critical legal identity documents. Both state entities and community groups therefore need to be engaged in reducing exclusion and fostering inclusion. Emphasizing the importance of one over the other risks reducing the viability and effectiveness of inclusion efforts as exclusion significantly results from combined interactions of the two. A second line of analysis, based on the concept of active and passive exclusion, suggests that a commonality in many cases concerning the groups in the Peduli pillars is the state's passive rather than active role, which needs to be challenged. Similarly, if the community is to be successfully engaged in countering stigmatization and other forms of discrimination and exclusion, a passive position will not be sufficient.

What types of stakeholders are involved in inclusion?

This section addresses the following questions: what types of stakeholders are involved in inclusion, and which are regarded as the most important? Table 3 below shows the types of change agents the 68 CSO partners identified in their ToC papers ranked by the number of times each was noted.

Table 3: Ranked Change Agents

Rank	Change Agents	Number of cases
1	The exclude group	257
2	Local government	99
3	Central goverment	75
4	External stakeholders	71
5	The community	71
6	Media organizations	40
7	Partner NGOs	23
8	Corporate entities	10
9	Komnas HAM	5
10	Schools	4

Addressing these types of change agents as ranked, the following observations provide further elucidation, and the relevance they have to exclusion in the different Peduli pillars.

The excluded group

Table 3 shows that the excluded minority groups, themselves were clearly regarded by the CSOs as the most important change agents. Examining the ToC reports in more detail, it becomes apparent that for all the excluded groups in the Peduli pillars under consideration, with the exception of vulnerable children and youth, this conception of community driven change has two main dimensions. Internally, it was accepted that a number of groups recognize that changes are required in their existing social attitudes and configurations in order to increase space for dialogue with external groups, and the possibility of improved social acceptance. A number of CSOs also reported how they saw the increased empowerment of women, who are often discriminated against and considered subordinate even within excluded groups, as important. Empowered women leaders were often considered a significant force for peace.

More commonly however, the CSOs reported how improved advocacy by the excluded groups, and the expansion of their networks to promote their rights among government decision makers and to improve their social relationships with other groups was key. It was suggested that it was important for discriminated religious minorities to become more involved in social activities in their communities, local level politics, and community forums concerned with village development, as well as to engage with other religious groups to build opportunities for dialogue, and advocate for recognition and tolerance.

Community empowerment was also reported to be a key element in enabling remote indigenous communities to advocate for improved access to infrastructure, social services and legal identity, and to work at local government level to promote and preserve indigenous traditions, promote understanding, and reduce stigmatization. For all of these groups, the quality and motivation of leaders was regarded as critical.

A slightly different perspective was suggested as being most relevant to victims of human rights violations. As well as their development and improving of organizational structures, this involves them connecting with relatively specialized CSOs and NGOs to form support groups to push for wider social inclusion and positive change, including improved access to social services at local and national government levels. The CSOs accepted that *waria* groups generally have well developed communication and advocacy skills, and established networks with other advocacy groups. These are very largely directed at efforts focused on local government to improve access to social services, and commercial groups to improve access to employment opportunities and financial services.

Local government

As well as by simply improving access for excluded groups to social services, including education and healthcare, local government was seen as having an important role to play in inducing positive change primarily by organizing campaigns promoting inclusion, and creating space for dialogue promoting cultural reconciliation and tolerance. It was reported that local government had access to cultural experts, and significant influence with security personnel, religious groups, prisons, schools, and local businesses. Its role in retracting existing bans on certain religious groups was seen as fundamental in setting a good

example of religious tolerance, and that this influence could extend to prohibiting discriminatory or stigmatizing religious speech in public. If local government developed a policy of affirmative action regarding the employment of certain groups, such as *waria*, or victims of human rights violations, and recognized non-orthodox marriages by amending the regulations that govern the issuing of marriage certificates, for example, the effects would be far reaching. Local government was also seen as a key actor in fulfilling children's health and education rights, providing economic support packages, and ensuring that employment law, such as that relating to child labour and workers' health and safety, was enforced. For all the groups in Peduli's pillars, the role of local government in recognizing the deleterious effects of social exclusion is of prime importance, as is its role in promulgating and enforcing non-discriminatory legislation.

Central government

Central government was reported to be seen as a key actor in ensuring equal and non-discriminatory access to legal identity, human rights (especially regarding historical violations), and land and property rights. As has been discussed, these issues have substantial effects on the ability of excluded groups to access social services delivered by local government, and develop and maintain livelihoods.

External stakeholders

Some remote indigenous communities in particular, along with a lesser number of discriminated religious minorities and victims of human rights violations, were reported to be in a position to benefit from intermediary groups who can act as go-betweens and mediators. In certain cases, on an ad hoc basis, it was suggested that these groups may have a role to play in reducing tension, or improving commercial links. External stakeholders were also reported to be in a

position to provide, for example, non-formal education (such as home schooling) as a possible pathway for children self-excluded for religious reasons by their families, or support to groups excluded from banking and other financial services. These groups are, however, reported on some occasions to be motivated primarily by self-interest and may exploit the excluded communities or individuals.

The community

The community, in particular community and religious leaders, were reported to be seen as key actors in changing community's perspectives and encouraging active interaction with other community members regardless of religion, caste, or status. In the same way that social exclusion, and its expression in forms such as stigmatization, are very much a result of community dynamics, the converse — social inclusion — is very much connected with community attitudes and actions. Young people and women were also often seen as key in arranging social gatherings and activities that crossed social divides and facilitated social interaction and promoted tolerance. Cooperative activities, such as providing clean water, increasing access to healthcare and education, and enhancing children's rights, that mix excluded groups with their excluders, are seen as offering significant potential benefit. Effective and influential community organizers were reported to be of primary importance, including in advocating for improved access to social services irrespective of religion or status. In some cases, the community was also reported to have significant influence on reducing exclusion, or its effects, within individual family units. This has included the community encouraging families to ensure that their children complete their education, and for families to accept that their children have been in trouble with the law.

Media organizations

Media organizations were reported to have an important role to play in unbiasedly reporting the issues related to religious discrimination in particular, and in supporting advocacy efforts related to victims of human rights violations. Concerning remote indigenous communities, it was reported that media action in spreading knowledge, increasing public interest, and promoting the importance of tradition was vital, and that they were in a powerful position to support the improvement in the position of vulnerable children and youth. More generally, it was reported that media organizations were important agents in reducing stereotyping and the persistence of stigmatization.

Partner NGOs

Partner NGOs (including the CSOs whose opinions are being collated and analyzed here) were seen as having an important role in supporting advocacy by, and on behalf of, all of the groups in the Peduli pillars under consideration. One major strand of potential NGO activity reported related to empowering the community. This included training key figures in excluded (and wider) communities, supporting the formation and management of relevant legal entities, offering expertise on how to organize community forums, and how to reach the relevant actors in national and local government. It was also suggested that partner NGOs could themselves play a direct role by lobbying local government, and local religious and community leaders, in favour of non-discrimination, by facilitating dialogue between groups, and by putting pressure on national government to fulfill its responsibilities regarding civil rights, particularly access to legal identity documents and marriage certificates, and legal certainty over land

ownership. Two main objectives were envisaged. One related to improving access to social services, including education and healthcare. The second concerned reducing exclusion more broadly. Regarding the latter, the NGOs were seen as having valuable links with academics, social activists, media organizations and influential cultural figures.

Partner NGOs were also reported to be a potential source of valuable technical expertise. Areas where such expertise is required included generating convincing empirical evidence regarding the numbers of vulnerable children excluded from school, documenting recent history and creating databases detailing confirmed human rights violations, guidance regarding the details of human rights law, and psychological support and rehabilitation.

Corporate entities

It was reported that corporate entities could act as agents of inclusion by introducing regulations that removed children from their labour forces, and ensured the safety and protection of all employees. It was also suggested that corporate entities were in an influential position to urge their employees to make sure that their children attend school. To this end, it was suggested that corporate social responsibility (CSR) funds might be directed at local schools.

Komnas HAM

The National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) was reported to be relevant in cases relating to the inclusion of victims of human rights violations, remote indigenous communities, and to a lesser degree, *waria*. For the former particularly, who are continuing to experience the effects of human rights violations committed decades ago, the formal recognition of their status as victims is crucial. Regarding *waria*, it was suggested that Komnas HAM might be able to reduce the incidence of unprovoked

attacks against *waria* by extremist religious organizations.

Schools

Aside from the need for regulations to be enforced regarding the non-exclusion of vulnerable children, and good practice to be inculcated regarding non-discrimination by teachers at school, it was reported that schools may have a role to play by providing good parenting forums, and by acting as a site where children and parents from diverse backgrounds can meet and interact in an inclusive environment.

Discussion

In the case of four of the five Peduli pillars under consideration – remote indigenous communities, discriminated religious minorities, victims of gross human rights violations and *waria* – the opinion of the CSOs was very clearly that the development of inclusionary processes lies substantially in the actions and capacity of the excluded minority group. For self-evident reasons related to the relative lack of power vulnerable children and youth possess, this opinion did not extend to this group. Regarding exclusion internal to excluded groups, such as discrimination against women and lower ranked members, it was recognized that that excluded communities are largely immune to external influences. Regarding the wholescale exclusion of one group by actors external to that group, it was recognized that efforts by the excluded group to interact and advocate on their own behalf is vital.

A number of conditions were identified that could facilitate and enable positive change driven by excluded groups. First, it was suggested that local government has an important role to play in creating the space for such interactions to occur, and examining and adjusting its own practices so as to minimize explicit discrimination in the official domain. Second, it was

suggested – in cases that relate both to internal and external exclusion – that the quality of leadership was important. A group with no leadership, or poor leadership, would face greater barriers to rearranging social conditions so as to improve inclusion. Third, the role of expert stakeholders, ideally with no identification or allegiance with either the excluded group, or the excluders, was recognized as being valuable in providing the technical skills required to foster inclusion such as obtaining empirical evidence, organizing, and running advocacy campaigns. In contrast to the relatively minor negative role the media is seen as playing in generating and maintaining exclusion, its potentially positive role in spreading knowledge, increasing public interest, and supporting advocacy efforts was stressed, along with – again – the importance of access to legal identity papers which is seen as the responsibility of central government.

Some groups face specific challenges. Remote indigenous communities, for example, may find increasing interactions with external groups difficult purely as a result of geographical isolation. Similarly, the conditions that have created the exclusions faced by victims of human rights violations are specific, and account very largely for the inclusion of Komnas HAM as a change agent, an agency which has a very specific remit to address these sorts of cases. The role of corporate entities as change agents also appears to be perceived as limited, and confined largely to actions within the corporate domain. It may also be the case that as limited numbers of excluded individuals have much interaction with corporate entities, their role in everyday life, and processes of exclusion, may not be fully appreciated.

The relative powerlessness of vulnerable children and youth also merits specific consideration. This is a group which has very little agency it is able to deploy on its own behalf, and so it is to be anticipated that the group will require particular efforts from external actors. In this context, the low ranking of schools as change agents might be considered peculiar. However, as many excluded children do not attend school, the influence of school on them, or on their behalf, is limited. Conversely, but no less significantly, excluded children and their parents are unlikely to have very much influence on attitudes and practices in schools. It may also be the case that the sorts of positive change that schools are well placed to engender over the generations, are simply considered to be too slow and gradual to merit attention.

By way of contrast, *waria* provide an interesting example of a group which in many cases is politically organized and is prepared to promote the common cause of its members. This is not to say that *waria* are on a smooth path to inclusion, or that there are no *waria* that continue to face stigmatization and even violence, but given the space opened by the need to address HIV/AIDS in the waria community, and the technical expertise that has been deployed by and on behalf of that community, a case could be made that its position is significantly different from that of other groups Peduli is targeting.

With these exceptions concerning the circumstances of specific groups in the Peduli pillars, and indeed an overarching one related to the vital role that central government is seen as playing in providing legal identify documents, it can be concluded that no one change agent has a particular priority in generating positive change towards inclusion. The critical elements are manifold: inclination and leadership within the excluded group, local government that is prepared to provide space, external groups that can provide technical expertise, and sympathetic media organizations. Such a combination of change agents, would in very many cases have a substantial effect on reducing social exclusion in all the Peduli pillars under consideration.

What types of social change are envisioned?

This section addresses the following questions: as categorized by Peduli's three outcomes, what types of social change are envisioned, and what are the most and least important?

Table 4 below shows an aggregated score for each of the pre-determined Peduli program outcomes which indicate the importance the CSO partners assign to them in working towards social inclusion. It should be noted that these outcomes fall into three categories as indicated by the first digit in the Outcome numbers. These are:

1. Increased access to public services and social assistance
2. Increased fulfilment of human rights
3. Improved policy on social inclusion

Table 4: Ranked Peduli Outcomes

Rank	Change Agents	Score
1	Outcome1.1 Increased access to livelihoods assistance	216
2	Outcome 2.3 Increased protection against violence and exploitation	142
3	Outcome 2.4 Improved recognition and socialacceptance of marginalized communities	109
4	Outcome 2.1 Increased sense of empowerment	103
5	Outcome 2.2 Increased civic participation	92
6	Outcome 3.2 National and regional lpolicy responsive to the economic and social needs of marginalized individuals	52
7	Outcome 1.2 Increased access to health services	51
8	Outcome 1.5 Access to legal identity and justice services	38
9	Outcome 3.1 Increasing policy maker's knowledge of social exclusion	31
10	Outcome 1.3 Increased access to education services	28
11	Outcome 1.4 Increased access to social protection	25

Discussion

At first glance, Outcome 1.1 'Increased access to livelihoods assistance', which is ranked first, appears to be a clear priority for the CSO partners. However, this cannot be taken at face value. Four of the top five ranked items directed at increased fulfilment of increased empowerment and social acceptance, overwhelmingly suggest that the CSO partners see such a focus as central in reducing social exclusion in Indo-nesia. Livelihoods as an entry point was criticised by an Independent Review of Phase 1. The program was then reoriented towards the CSOs gaining a more holistic understanding of pathways out of exclusion through improvements across all of the objectives.

Previous analyses related to Exclusion Actors (Table 2) suggested that both government (central and lo-

cal) and the Community were equally important in excluding minority groups. Furthermore, analyses on Change Agents (Table 3) again suggested that both government (central and local) and the Excluded group were the most important groups in inducing and maintaining positive change.

Linking these findings to the expected Outcomes, it might be suggested that state forces are central in addressing Outcome 2.3 (Increased protection against violence and exploitation) and Outcome 2.4 (Improved recognition and social acceptance of marginalised communities). For example, the *Waria* community in Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan suffer from social exclusion not only from their own families, but also from extremist groups such as the FPI in the form of verbal and, at times, physical violence. The police exacerbate this exclusion through inaction (failing to interfere and protect), and by raiding and arresting *Waria*. In this case, state forces (the police) are expected to act as actors of inclusion by ensuring *Waria* safety and security; and community members to be more accepting. Another suggestion is that the Community (both the excluded group and the excluders) are central in addressing Outcome 2.1 (Increased sense of empowerment) and Outcome 2.2 (Increased civic participation). For example, the Suku Dayak Hindu Budha in Segandu are declared '*sesat*' / lost by the MUI Indramayu and are socially and politically excluded by the community. They are denied involvement in village meetings have no decision-making rights. The CSO expect both the excluded and excluders to actively encourage interaction as a way of promoting tolerance and civic participation.

Improved policy, represented in the Table 4 by Outcome 3.2 'National and regional policy responsive to the economic and social needs of marginalized individuals' and Outcome' 3.1 'Increasing policy maker's knowledge of social exclusion' are ranked middling to low, with Outcome 3.1 'Increasing policy maker's

knowledge of social exclusion' ranked towards the bottom. This would suggest that improved policy is not considered the most relevant entry point by the CSO partners, and policy makers (who, for the most part, can be assumed to not have good knowledge of social exclusion currently) are held in some disregard with respect to their involvement in the process, and their influence over it. As has been noted, in many cases in Indonesia, poor policy is not at the root of social challenges. Often policy is at least adequate, but problems exist in its consistent implementation, particularly given the country's high level of decentralization, and confusions and contestations over exactly where authority and responsibility lies. Even in cases where Legal Identity (the State as an actor of exclusion) is seen to be the root of exclusion, the State - and their capacity to issue legal identity - is rarely seen as the main Actor of Inclusion. The Adat Ammatoa community in Sulawesi, being practitioners of their ancestor's religion - and hence do not fall under one of the five legally recognised religions - have difficulty accessing legal identity (KTP) and the benefits that follow (such as government subsidised healthcare and education). However, the main expected outcome is not government-recognised legal identity, but rather the social acceptance and recognition of the Dayak Losarang culture and tradition.

What is clear from Table 4 is that with Outcome 1.1 'Increased access to livelihoods assistance' set aside, category 1 'Increased access to public services and social assistance' is not seen as a priority by CSO partners when it comes to reducing social exclusion. With Outcome 1.2 'Increased access to health services', Outcome 1.5 'Access to legal identity and justice services', Outcome 1.3 'Increased access to education services' and Outcome 1.4 'Increased access to social protection' all ranked (in the given order) in the bottom half of the table, it is clear that the priority types of social change envisioned relate to improving human rights, reducing violence and exploitation,

increasing the social acceptance of marginalized communities along with their sense of empowerment and civic participation.

While it is recognized that pathways for inclusion are not linear and that often time, the below graphic is helpful for understanding the starting points that CSOs identified as starting points for their interventions.

The results in Table 4 suggest that CSO partners are much inclined towards seeing social acceptance as the first step towards reducing social exclusion, and limiting its debilitating consequences. This approach is contrasted with an initial focus on improving policy, or increasing access to services, which the results suggest are both seen as lesser priorities. Given an increase in social acceptance, this model suggests that increased access to services will follow, as in due course will improved policy, and/or implementation of it. This correlates with findings from Table 3 (Ranked Change Agents), in which 'the Excluded Group' ranks significantly higher than other change agents, in their ability to self-empower and attempt inclusion with external communities.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that the most common types of social exclusion that detrimentally affect the groups in all the Peduli pillars in this study result from the central government in relation to barriers to accessing official documents, particularly legal identity documents, and birth and marriage certificates. The effects of the lack of these documents cascades downwards, creating barriers to all sorts of public services such as education, health and social welfare, as well as to land ownership, and employment by the state and other livelihood opportunities.

Otherwise, each of the groups in the Peduli pillars to a large degree experience varying types of exclusion specific to their particular circumstances. Remote indigenous communities experience exclusion most significantly as a result of geographical isolation, and may suffer stigmatization by external groups. Discriminated religious minorities are also stigmatized, and often experience intimidation and violence. Victims of human rights violations suffer badly from stigmatization and self-exclusion, as do vulnerable children and *waria*. Whilst stigmatization is clearly the most common form of social exclusion experienced, it is impossible to rank which is more or less significant, as the degree to which certain stigma impacts on somebody's life is a subjective understanding.

Two main types of actors have been identified as most significantly involved in exclusion: the state, and excluding majority communities. The former discrimi-

nates most significantly by creating barriers to official documents, particularly legal identity documents. The latter discriminates most significantly through stigmatization. This study has shown that these two types of discrimination are at least correlated. Those without legal identity documents are more often stigmatized, and those stigmatized face greater barriers to accessing legal identity documents. While the correlation of the root cause is unclear, it is expected that the program will be able to answer if having legal documents leads to a decline of social stigma, both from the community and other service providers.

Each of the groups in the Peduli pillars experiences different types of barriers to accessing legal identity documents. *Waria* and vulnerable children may be estranged from their families and so lack the documents required to apply for an identity card when they are entitled to at age 17. Religious minorities are likely to be inhibited from even applying, as they are expected to state their adherence to one of the six officially sanctioned religions, or suffer a stigmatizing '-' to be shown on their identity documents. Remote indigenous communities who do not clearly adhere to one of the official religions may have a similar experience, or they may lack any official documents, such as birth certificates, or live at such a distance from officialdom that even making an application is challenging and therefore not prioritised. The position of victims of historical human rights violations is often

different in that they can be prohibited from even applying for identity documents, or given their experience, they may harbour angst and fear of the state and they do not wish even to carry such documents. In all cases, the lack of such documents is passed through the generations: if parents cannot present a full set of official documents, their children will be disadvantaged.

With the exception of the state's agency in creating barriers to identity documents, and indeed the case of vulnerable children and youth, who are accepted to lack the power needed to affect their own circumstances, the study shows that the most important stakeholders involved in inclusion are considered to be the excluded group themselves. However, it is also evident that that no single stakeholder group acting independently has the power needed to generate inclusion. Capacity, inclination and leadership within the excluded group needs to be combined with local government efforts, external group expertise, and positive media coverage.

As categorized by Peduli's three outcomes, the study shows that improving social acceptance is considered to be the most important first step towards reducing social exclusion, which will lead to increased access to services, and subsequently to improved policy. First steps that involve improving policy, or increasing access to services, are both identified as steps to follow after these issues have been addressed.

Nevertheless, a very major element in reducing social exclusion is doubtlessly to ensure that all citizens have equal access to legal identity. The CSOs defined that policy initiatives that remove the need for religion (or the lack of one) to be marked on identity cards would address significant barriers facing religious minorities, and to a lesser degree some remote indigenous communities. However, the extent to which this is a realistic goal that could be achieved within the current program phase is questionable.

The latter group would also benefit from initiatives that removed the need to have an official, permanent address, in order to hold official identity documents, and outreach activities that ensured every child born was provided with a birth certificate, no matter how remote the location. Similarly, the opportunity to have marriages formalized in the secular circumstances that do not currently exist in Indonesia would bring benefits for a number of groups, including those that stand outside Peduli's concern, although may fall outside the scope of the current Peduli program.

Victims of human rights violations, vulnerable children and youth, and *waria* have more tangential relationships with the barriers that exist to official identity. In the case of the former, it is evident that a deep and wide ranging set of official inquiries is required in order to address issues that go far beyond barriers to identity cards. If, however, these prove politically impossible to accomplish (as has been the case to date), this group should specifically be included in any official efforts to make legal identity more widely available. Vulnerable children and youth, and *waria*, face barriers relating to their families. In some cases, these barriers result from their parents' lack of official documents, and in others they result from lack of access to their parents, and the documents they hold, possibly as a result of estrangement. In either case, if exclusion is not going to be systematically carried down the generations, some official allowance will be required to address these circumstances.

Given wider access to official identity documents, and uptake by excluded individuals, benefits would accrue that go beyond the increased access to public services, land ownership, and livelihood opportunities already mentioned. Security personnel and corporate actors are less likely to move illegally against fully documented citizens, and the former are more likely to be called on, if needed, and called to account when necessary. Fully documented citizenship also

potentially levels caste, class and race distinctions, and as properly documented and the assumption is that, registered citizens have a vote, and are less likely to be excluded from politics at all levels. Equality of citizenship is fundamental to addressing unequal balances of power in a democracy.

That said, current regulations (specifically Law 23 of 2006 on Child Protection) require all Indonesian citizens over 17, and those married, to have a KTP identity document, yet this study has shown that very many individuals in socially excluded groups do not, and face significant barriers to obtaining one. The issue, which relates to many governance challenges in Indonesia, is not so much the lack of policy, or even that policy is explicitly discriminatory, but that what might be considered broadly satisfactory policy is not consistently implemented. In this, the state's role may be seen to be passive rather than active in allowing discrimination to persist.

The correlation this study has identified between state exclusion (most commonly represented, as discussed, by barriers to official identity) and community exclusion (most commonly represented by stigmatization) is recognised in the literature on social exclusion: dominant institutions may apply negative attributes which are then used to legitimize exclusion and the subsequent repression and even stigmatization of particular individuals or groups. A remaining question relating to directionality, may be answered in time as Peduli progresses, and that is, does stigma from the community and service providers decline when official documents have been issued and services have been delivered? A scatter chart, setting the difficulty of obtaining official identity documents against the degree of stigmatization experienced, ideally for each Peduli pillar, would provide an interesting representation of the correlation. Thereafter, more ethnographic work would be required that draws more directly on the experiences of the excluded

groups than this study, which depends on data drawn from professional expert groups working on social exclusion. Another interesting ethnographical line to follow would be to investigate to what degree 'othering' – the means by which a group defines own identity by excluding others – is relevant. Do groups which have more homogenous identities exclude more or less than those which have weaker or more threatened identities?

In conclusion, and accepting the importance of legal identity for all groups in the Peduli pillars under consideration, given that it has been determined that the most important actors involved in inclusion are the excluded group themselves, and that a combination of efforts by the excluded group (involving capacity, inclination and leadership), local government (involving a determination to create the space that allows interaction between excluded groups and their excluders), NGOs(providing technical expertise) and impartial media organizations, the following observations can be offered on how positive social change can be most effectively generated in each of Peduli's pillars.

More than any other group, vulnerable children and youth need support from external agencies. It is accepted that they do not have the power required to improve their own circumstances. Capacity, inclination and leadership are not attributes that can be expected from this group. Here, local government and NGO groups have key roles to play, if the excluded children's families will not or cannot, and given the daily interactions in broader society of very many of these excluded individuals, improving social acceptance is critical.

Aside from a geographical isolation that can effectively render them invisible to officialdom, remote indigenous communities reliant on natural resources depend most significantly on capacity, inclination and leadership within their own groups. NGO actors are

available to support them, but the inclination of local government, which may be subject to undue influences and involved in questionable practices relating to land ownership and the exploitation of valuable natural resources, cannot be depended on. Improving social acceptance may be less important in this case if the excluded groups to do have regular contact with external groups, but media support for an inclusive position grounded on the indivisibility and universality of human rights, and the acceptance or – better – the celebration of cultural diversity is important.

Perhaps more than any other of the excluded groups, discriminated religious minorities would benefit from a policy revision regarding the need to subscribe to an officially sanctioned religion, and the requirement for this to be presented on identity documents. These groups are also subjected to the most persistent violent attacks, organized by extremist groups. In this, the issue of 'othering', as mentioned above, possibly has the greatest bearing on this group. By identifying a supposedly aberrant or deviant religion, adherents of another can substantially bolster their own beliefs. Religious minorities often live mixed closely with other groups, and can count less on the support of local government agencies, NGOs, and the media than any of the other groups in the Peduli pillars. With tolerance, rather than social acceptance, more the attribute required in external groups (and indeed internally), in these circumstances religious minorities are forced to depend very largely on their own capacity, inclination and leadership.

As has been mentioned, victims of historical human rights violations, including their families and children, stand as a special case whose inclusion has a clear starting point: a reputable official investigation that clears their names, other issues such as awarding compensation remains a debateable issue within the human rights community itself. As things stand at the national level, however, such an event is unlikely, and even if an apology was accomplished, the extent it

would likely reduce stigmatization and discrimination remains unknown. However, efforts at fulfilling fundamental human rights, at the local level is within reach and something that Peduli is designed to respond to. With victims geographically dispersed and relatively small in numbers, the capacity and leadership attributes that might be brought to bear internally on issues of presenting the discourse of human rights and engaging local governments are critical.

Waria also stand as quite a distinct case of social exclusion in Indonesia. Some groups of *waria* are well organized. Again, 'othering' may be a specific relevant issue, but given that some *waria* groups are demonstrating the sort of self-reliance that this study has identified as important, and in many cases clearly possess the required internal attributes of capacity, inclination and leadership, their case might serve as a test of the analysis presented here, particularly if any group can count on expert NGO support, enthusiastic local government involvement, and positive media coverage by focusing on pre-existing indigenous concepts of *waria*, such as the *bissu* in Sulawesi.

It can therefore be seen that whilst there are some commonalities in the circumstances and experiences of exclusion, and the elements required to work towards inclusion, every excluded group in the different Peduli pillars addressed here, has its own particular local contexts and experiences, which need local and particular solutions. This is one major concluding point: aside from the primary importance of unfettered access to legal identity, there is no 'one-size-fits-all' solution to social exclusion. Another major conclusion is that no single stakeholder group acting independently has the capacity to generate inclusion. Irrespective of whether social acceptance, policy improvements, or access to services is taken as the most relevant starting point, effectively addressing the debilitating consequences of exclusion requires collaborative efforts and coalitions for inclusion.

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